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I. INTRODUCTION
This article presents a plan for revitalizing the Louisiana corporate income tax
through the adoption of a combined reporting regime. Our plan would require
affiliated companies engaged in a unitary business in the State to pay their
Louisiana income tax based on an apportioned share of their combined income.
Combined reporting is the only effective way for any state to impose a fair and
uniform corporation income tax on multistate and multinational enterprises and to
gain or maintain control over its own tax base. The current Louisiana corporate
income tax is subject to abuse through tax planning techniques that are very
familiar to members of the tax-avoidance community. California and other states
that have adopted combined reporting have demonstrated that combined reporting
fairly and effectively responds to most of these common tax avoidance techniques.
Part H, below, discusses the potential benefits inuring to Louisiana from
adopting a combined reporting regime. Those benefits are not mere speculation.
California has been operating a combined reporting system successfully for nearly
seven decades. In brief, the benefits are a uniform treatment of corporate groups
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without regard for differences in their organizational structure, a strong bulwark
against the use of tax-haven jurisdictions to avoid state taxation, a significant
reduction in administrative burdens on the tax department and on complying
taxpayers, and the removal of the competitive disadvantage currently imposed on
local firms that are unable to engage in cross-border tax-avoidance.
In Part III, we address some basic issues in the design of an effective combined
reporting regime. One of the important features of combined reporting is the use
of a formula to apportion the unitary business income of a unitary enterprise
between Louisiana and the rest of the relevant universe. Louisiana already uses
formulary apportionment in its current corporate tax system. To operate a
combined reporting regime, however, Louisiana must apply that formula not to the
separate income of each corporation but to the combined income of a corporate
group engaged in a unitary business in Louisiana. Yielding to political realities, we
recommend that Louisiana offer companies a water's edge election that would
allow them to exclude from their combined report the income derived by certain
foreign affiliates that do not have an obvious close tie to the unitary business
conducted in Louisiana.
Part IV addresses a variety of technical issues that Louisiana should address
when adopting a combined reporting regime. We offer our views on how those
issues should be resolved, drawing, when appropriate, on the experience of other
combined-reporting states. Some of these issues relate to potential transition
problems. Other issues relate to practical problems of assessing and collecting a tax
from corporations operating in Louisiana on income that is computed by reference
tothe combined income of a unitary group. A brief conclusion is presented in Part
V.
In adopting a combined reporting regime, we recommend that Louisiana follow
the well-marked trail forged by California and other combined-reporting states.
Those states have solved many technical difficulties and have won many important
victories in the courts.' We see no good reason why Louisiana should fight those
battles anew by introducing untested provisions into its combined reporting regime.
We also strongly favor uniform state taxing rules, and uniformity is obviously
enhanced when states borrow from the successful experiments of sister states. We
do not suggest, however, that Louisiana should avoid innovation when the
experience of the combined-reporting states has been unhappy. The combined-
reporting regime we recommend, if adopted by Louisiana, would have a definite
Cajun flavor.
1. The two leading combined-reporting cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court are Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 463 U.S. 159, 103 S. Ct. 2983 (1983), and
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994). In
Container, California successfully defended its combined-reporting regime, as applied to a U.S.-based
multinational enterprise, against attacks based on the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
Barclays Bank upheld the California system as applied to a foreign-based multinational enterprise
against attacks based on the Foreign Commerce Clause.
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II. BENEFITS OF COMBINED REPORTING
Louisiana has long employed a system of formulary apportionment for
determining the Louisiana taxable income of a corporation that is operating within
and without Louisiana through multiple divisions or branches. In adopting
formulary apportionment, the Louisiana Legislature has implicitly concluded that
apportioning income by payroll, property, and receipts (sales) is superior, as a
system of tax accounting, to a system based on the separate transactions of the
taxpayer, as reflected on its books of account. The case for combined reporting is
a logical extension of the case for apportioning by formula the business income of
an individual corporation. The rationale of both cases is that the substance of the
business activities in the state should control, not the organizational structure of the
business entity or entities conducting those activities. That is, whether a business
enterprise chooses to have numerous divisions or whether it chooses to incorporate
those divisions and operate them as subsidiaries should have as little impact as
feasible on the amount of Louisiana income tax paid by that enterprise.
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that combined reporting is both
a better method for measuring the income of a unitary business and a safeguard
against taxpayer manipulation:
The problem with [formal geographical or transactional accounting,
including separate accounting] is that formal accounting is subject to
manipulation and imprecision, and often ignores or captures inadequately
the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take
place among the components of a single enterprise. The unitary
business/formula apportionment method is a very different approach to
the problem of taxing businesses operating in more than one jurisdiction.
It rejects geographical or transactional accounting, and instead calculates
the local tax base by first defining the scope of the "unitary business" of
which the taxed enterprise's activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one
part, and then apportioning the total income of that "unitary business"
between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the basis of a
formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation's
activities within and without the jurisdiction.2
Section II.A., below, presents support for the U.S. Supreme Court's assertion
that combined reporting is a superior method for determining the in-state income
of a member of a unitary group of corporations. In Section II.B., we explain how
a combined reporting regime protects a state against various tax-avoidance
techniques that multistate companies routinely use to lower their tax bills in
separate reporting states. Section II.C., examines the potential of combined
reporting for simplifying the Louisiana corporate income tax.
2. Container,463 U.S. at 164-65,103 S. Ct. at 2940 (citations omitted). These sentiments were
repeated in part in Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 303-04, 114 S. Ct. at 2272.
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Our recommendation that Louisiana adopt combined reporting does not
mean that we would eliminate the use of the separate accounting method
entirely. Louisiana law currently permits taxpayers to apply to the tax
department for permission to use separate accounting under certain conditions
"if the taxpayer shows that the apportionment method produces a manifestly
unfair result."3 We would continue that rule as a useful safeguard against unfair
results and as a protection against constitutional attacks on Louisiana's use of
formulary apportionment.4
A. Better Measurement of In-State Income
Under Louisiana's separate reporting regime, the amount of corporate
income taxes that a unitary group of corporations pays to Louisiana depends on
the structure of the corporate group. A corporation is likely to pay a different
amount of tax, for example, if it incorporates a branch or division or if it
liquidates a subsidiary. Under combined reporting, unitary groups that are
similarly situated generally would pay the same aggregate amount of Louisiana
tax regardless of their corporate structure. There are some exceptions to the
general goal, due to factors outside the control of the Louisiana Legislature. The
exceptions, however, are just that; they do not undermine the general goal.'
Combined reporting also helps create a level playing field for intrastate
corporate groups, whether large or small, and multistate corporate groups. A
unitary group that is engaged in business only in Louisiana is taxable on all of
its income under Louisiana's current system of separate reporting. The adoption
of combined reporting would not change that result. A multistate corporate
group, however, is currently able to reduce its Louisiana apportionable income,
and hence its Louisiana income taxes, by isolating highly profitable parts of its
3. La. R.S. 47:287.94(C)(2001). Some administrative flexibility may be required to prevent an
unconstitutional tax on extraterritorial values. See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel.
Maxwell,283 U.S. 123,51 S. Ct. 2933 (193 1) (allowing the taxpayer to introduce evidence to challenge
the apportionment resulting under a one-factor (property) apportionment formula based on an offer of
proof that the formula produced an unreasonable and arbitrary result, out of all appropriate relationship
to the business activities in the state).
4. See Unif. Div. of Income For Tax Purposes Act § 18, 7A U.L.A. 331 (1985) [hereinafter
UDITPA] (providing similar escape hatch). The Louisiana corporate tax statute is not based on
UDITPA, although UDITPA and the Louisiana statute have many common elements. We do not
discuss in this Article whether Louisiana should adopt UDITPA.
5. One significant exception to the equal treatment of similarly situated unitary groups is the
result of the protection against state income taxation provided in Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
272, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (73 Stat. 555) 613 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 381 et seq.). That Federal law
limits the ability of a state to tax a corporation when thecorporation's only connection with the state
is through the solicitation of sales within the state. That protection extends, however, only to the
corporationitself--not to the unitary group of which it is a member. As a result, a corporate group that
is organized as a single corporationmightbe ineligible for protection underPub. L. No. 86-272,whereas
a corporate group that placed its purely solicitation activities inone corporation and its disqualifying
activities in another corporation might obtain at least some protection.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
unitary business in a corporation that is not taxable in Louisiana. Under
combined reporting, this advantage for the multistate enterprise is eliminated.6
The improved equity under combined reporting is due to its superiority over
separate reporting as a method of tax accounting. The premise of combined
reporting is that the synergies, interdependencies, and sharing ofknowledge, know-
how, and experiences that are typical features of a unitary business often cannot be
properly captured by separate entity accounting. By taking into account only the
income and factors of the corporation having nexus with the taxing state, separate-
entity accounting often cannot provide an accurate measurement of the income of
the unitary business that is properly attributable to that state. A combined reporting
regime, in contrast, avoids this failing by automatically apportioning all of the
unitary business income of a unitary group among the states where it is engaging
in meaningful business activities.
To illustrate, consider a unitary oil enterprise that explores, refines, and
markets oil products. The parent company is PCo. PCo is assured by its geologists
that an oil field that straddles Texas and Louisiana is rich in oil. The geologists
estimate that if ten wells are drilled, one is likely to be a gusher and the other nine
wells will be dry holes. PCo directs LCo, its Louisiana subsidiary, to drill for oil
on the Louisiana side of the oil field. It directs its Texas subsidiary, TCo, to drill
on the Texas side. LCo drills five holes and finds no oil. TCo also drills five holes
and discovers oil. The crude oil is transferred to RCo, another subsidiary of PCo,
and RCo refines it into gasoline at a Texas refinery. The gasoline is sold in
California by CCo, another PCo subsidiary. The profits for the year from the
combined activities of the related companies are $100. Under separate accounting,
none of that income would be apportioned to Louisiana. Yet the Louisiana
activities were integral to finding oil in Texas and to the other operations of the
unitary business.
Adding additional facts to the scenario above would further complicate the
problem of assigning income under a separate reporting system. Assume, for
example, that RCo, the Texas refinery, used oil produced in a prior year by LCo,
the Louisiana subsidiary, in producing gasoline for the California market. Under
separate reporting, LCo would have no income in the current year, notwithstanding
its substantial contribution to the profits of the unitary business. It would have
income in the prior year, however, calculated by assigning a sales price to its
transfer of crude oil to RCo. Under a combined reporting regime, LCo would be
taxable on its apportioned share of the income of the unitary business in the year
the income was actually earned.
The more facts that are added to the above example, the more difficult it
becomes to determine the income of each affiliated company under a separate
reporting regime. Assume that PCo's geologists, based in Oklahoma, were
extraordinarily talented in predicting where the unitary business should drill.
Should the activities of the geologists be taken into account in computing the
6. Examples of the tax-planning advantages available to the multistate enterprise under the
separate reporting system are addressed infra in Section l.B.
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income apportioned to Louisiana? In what way? Assume also that the Texas
refinery, RCo, was inefficient because it used obsolete equipment. Should no
profits be attributed to it? What if RCo used that equipment temporarily in order
to allow the unitary group to hold its market while a new refinery was under
construction? What if the $100 of profits were attributable entirely to a spike in
the world price of oil resulting from a decision of the OPEC cartel?
All of the above questions must be answered in a satisfactory and consistent
way for separate accounting to operate successfully. In addition, they must be
answered consistently in the states where the unitary business operates. They
will be answered initially by the taxpayer when it prepares its tax books. The
taxpayer is likely to resolve doubtful issues in its favor. The tax department may
have difficulty challenging the taxpayer's reported income absent some clear
showing of abuse.
The example above dealt with affiliated companies engaged in transactions
between related entities for which the market provides at least some evidence of
arm's length prices.7 In many cases of related-person transactions, however,
market prices cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy. Market prices are
particularly difficult to obtain for the value contributed through use of intangible
property, such as a trademark, patent, trade secret, franchise, customer list,
copyright, unique management system, and know-how.
Market prices are also difficult to estimate when one related company
transfers value to another under conditions that would not be duplicated in
transactions between unrelated persons. Consider, for example, the transfer of
value that occurs when the vice president of LCo, an affiliated company that
manufactures telephones, calls the vice president of TCo, the affiliated company
engaged in research and design. The LCo vice president resolves a problem
facing TCo in a way that will increase corporate profitability significantly. LCo
operates only in Louisiana and TCo operates only in Texas. No comparable
prices will be available to allow LCo and TCo to determine in an objective
manner the value of that telephone call.
As a further example, consider a unitary business that operates two stores.
One store is operated by LCo in Louisiana and the other store is operated by
MCo in Mississippi. LCo, the parent corporation, buys inventory centrally for
itself and MCo, getting a volume discount. On a separate accounting basis, MCo
reports a high profit to Mississippi and LCo breaks even in Louisiana. If LCo
closed its store in Louisiana, the profits of MCo would decline because its unit
costs for inventory would increase. Under these facts, it is clear that LCo
contributes to the profitability of MCo. The result reached under separate
accounting, which does not take LCo's contribution into account, is misleading.'
In a combined reporting regime, none of the difficult questions posed above
needs to be answered. The goal of combined reporting is to apportion the entire
7. In Exxon Corp. v. Dept. ofRevenue of Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207, 100 S. Ct. 2109(1980), the
Courtheld that combinedreportingand formulary apportionment is preferred to the arm's length method
of apportionment even in the face of good price data.
8. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701 (1942).
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unitary income of a business enterprise among the states where it operates. By
using a fixed formula, the combined report largely eliminates opportunities for a
state to manipulate the rules to maximize its revenues. Similarly, it eliminates
opportunities for unitary businesses to manipulate the rules to minimize, their tax
obligations. Minor imperfections in the operation of combined reporting are likely
to average out over time because of the absence of any systemic bias in favor of
increasing or reducing a state's entitlement to tax revenue.
B. Protection Against Tax-Minimization Strategies
The many techniques that tax planners have developed to exploit the
weaknesses of a separate reporting system are too numerous to catalog in this
Article. One popular strategy for a corporate group is to isolate nexus-creating
activities and property of its unitary business in one corporation. That corporation
is taxable by the state on an apportioned share of its taxable income. Other
members of that group, however, have no nexus-creating activities or property in
the state and are thereby insulated from tax by that state on any part of their unitary
income. As a result, the state only gets to tax that portion of the income of the
unitary group that appears on the books of account of the corporation having nexus
with the state, even though all of the members of the corporate group are engaged
in the same unitary business.
Another technique used by multistate and multinational corporate groups to
minimize state income taxes is to create an intra-group expense on the books of a
corporation having nexus with the state that is payable to another member of the
unitary group located outside the state, typically in a tax haven. Yet another
technique is for the members of a unitary group to set the prices charged for the
transfer or provision of goods and services to related persons in a way that allows
them to shift income from high-tax states to low-tax states. Tax planners may use
some or all of these techniques simultaneously.
A separate reporting state is not defenseless against these tax-planning
techniques. To combat them, however, its tax department must take aggressive
action to detect their use and to find some way under the separate reporting rules
to subject the deflected income to tax. Sometimes the tax department will enjoy
some measure of success. In some cases, however, the unitary group is successful
in having its tax-planing techniques upheld.'
The combined report directly blocks these techniques and other similar tax-
minimization strategies. The isolation of nexus-creating activities in a single
corporation is impossible because the state imposes its income tax on. an
apportioned share of the aggregate income of the members of the unitary group.
Deflecting income by manipulating transfer prices or by setting up inter-company
9. In SYL, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, No.
24-C-99002389AA (Mar. 17,2000), aff'g Maryland Tax Court, No. C-96-0154-01 (Apr. 26, 1999),
the court indicated that it would not stretch the letter of the law to prevent tax avoidance when the state
could have prevented that avoidance by adopting a combined reporting regime.
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payables is unsuccessful because transactions between members of a unitary group
are washed out in preparing the combined report.'0
The advantages of combined reporting in combating tax avoidance are nicely
illustrated by examining the treatment of tax-haven holding companies under
separate reporting and combined reporting. The use of a holding company is a
common tax-minimization technique in Louisiana and other separate reporting
states." In the typical approach, the holding company is domiciled in a state that
has no income tax or has favorable rules on the taxation of passive income. One
state with these favorable rules is Delaware. Under Delaware law, a corporation
is not subject to Delaware tax if its activities in that State are limited to maintaining
and managing intangible assets that generate income such as capital gains,
dividends, interest, and royalties. 2
As an example of the potential advantages of using a holding company,
assume that PCo is a corporation that is domiciled in Texas and is engaged in
business in Louisiana. PCo establishes HCo, a holding company domiciled in
Delaware. 3 PCo transfers valuable trademarks and trade names that it is using in
its business to HCo. HCo executes a license agreement allowing PCo to use the
transferred property in exchange for a royalty equal to five percent of its sales
receipts. PCo deducts the royalty payment to HCo in calculating its pre-
apportionment income. The royalty income is not taxed by Delaware.
The licensing of a trademark is only one way of using a Delaware holding
company to generate a deduction for the payer without any tax being paid by the
payee. Another way involves loans made by the Delaware corporation to the
related payer corporations. Assume, for example, that PCo in the example above
needs additional capital for its business. HCo has accumulated a large cash pool
from its royalty income. HCo loans PCo $500 at a market interest rate of 8 percent.
The annual interest payment of $40 ($500 x .08) is deducted by PCo in computing
its pre-apportionment income. The interest income of that same amount is not
taxable to HCo because of the exemption provided by Delaware.
As noted above, a separate reporting state like Louisiana can assert a variety
of arguments to defeat the tax-minimization strategies described above. The tax
10. For discussion of the wash rule, see infra Part IV.C. 1.
11. There are many types of holding companies. Here we are concerned primarily with
companies organized in a tax-haven jurisdiction that hold intellectual property or other intangible
property made available for a fee to affiliated companies engaged in business in the taxing state.
12. Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (1997). As an alternative to Delaware, a holding
company could be based in a state without an income tax, such as Nevada. An even better strategy,
because it is less of a red flag to auditors, may be to create a holding company in a state in which the
taxpayer is already filing a combined report.
13. The creation and operation of Delaware holdingcompanies has become a specialty of certain
Wilmington-based banks. A pamphlet of one of these banks promises to arrange for the rental of office
space, telephone answering services, secretarial help, and accounting and legal services through
Delaware's top accounting and legal firms. "By developing relationships with these Delaware
professionals,the substance ofyour Delaware holdingcompanywill be further reinforced." See Richard
D. Pomp and Oliver Oldman, State & Local Taxation 10-34 n.204 (4th ed. 200 1) [hereinafter Pomp &
Oldman, State & Local].
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department may argue that the holding company lacks substance and should be
ignored for tax purposes. The transfer of intangible assets to the holding company
might be challenged as lacking a business purpose or lacking substance. Louisiana
might assert nexus over the holding company on account of the company's
exploitation of the Louisiana market 4 or the business situs of the intangible
property generating the income. It might try to impose a withholding tax on the
income paid to the holding company.'" It might deny the in-state company a
deduction for amounts paid to the holding company on the ground that they are not
legitimate business expenses.' 6 It might recharacterize the payments to the holding
company as capital expenditures. It might recharacterize the holding company's
debt instrument as an equity investment, so that payments on that instrument would
become non-deductible dividends.
Whether some or all of the various arguments suggested above will prevail in
court is likely to depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There can be
legitimate reasons for creating a holding company, and special-purpose subsidiaries
are a common feature of corporate America. The case law is full of illustrations of
the good, the bad, and the ugly.'7
The advantage of combined reporting is that it makes arguments of the type
suggested above unnecessary. The tax advantage of the holding company is
nullified without the state having to prevail on one or more of these arguments as
14. See, e.g., Geoflrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E.2d 13 (1993).
15. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a foreign corporation licensing a trademark for use in the
United States would be subject to federal tax on the amount of the royalties, typically at a rate of 30
percent. See I.R.C. §§ 861(aX4); 881(aX)(2001); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-5 (as amended in 1975). Many
U.S. tax treaties provide an exemption or reduced withholding rate for residents of the Contracting
States on a reciprocal basis. See, e.g. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Sept.
26, 1980, U.S.-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 11087 at 15 (enforceable Aug. 16, 1984) (reducing withholding
rate in both countries to 10 percent); Convention on Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31,1975,
U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5681 (enforceable Apr. 25, 1980) (reducing withholdingrate to zero). Unlike the
states, the Federal governmentis free to tax royalties without the constraints imposed by the dormant
Commerce Clause.
16. Some states have recently adopted anti-holding company legislation disallowing deductions
for payments made to certain related entities. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.052 (West Supp. 2001);
Iowa Code Ann. § 422.61 (West 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 12-218c (West 2000).
17. For a sampling of cases in which a state challenged a holding company arrangement, see In
the Matter of the Petition of Sherwin- Williams, No. 816712 (N.Y. Tax App. June 7, 200 1), SYL, Inc.
v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-96-0154-01, 1999 WL 322666 (Md. Tax Ct. Apr. 26, 1999);
Crown Cork& Sealv. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-97-0028-01,1999 WL 322699(Md. Tax Ct.
Apr. 26, 1999);In re Burnham Corp., DTA No. 814531,1997N.Y. Tax Lexis 304 (N.Y. Tax App. July
10, 1997); In the Matter of the Petition of Express, Inc. et al., DTA Nos. 812330, 812331, 812332,
812334,1995 N.Y. Tax Lexis 493 (N.Y. Tax. App. Sept. 14, 1995); Kmart Properties, Inc. (KPI).
Decision of Hearing Officer, New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, No. 00-04, NM ID. No.
01-287446-006 (Feb. 1,2000), available at <http://www.state.nm.us/tax/d&o/dno2000_04.htn> (citing
memorandum from Detroit office of Price Waterhouse that concluded that "if structured properly, a
company formed to hold and license Kmart's intellectual property could generate significant state and
local income tax savings for Kmart in states which allow separate entity filing for corporate income
taxes as well as other non-tax benefits"). See generally Peter L. Faber, Planning for the Use of
Intangible Holding Companies, 14 State Tax Notes 1931 (1998). For a recent case interpreting the
meaning of business purpose, see Exparte Sonat, 752 So. 2d 1211 (Ala. 1999).
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long as the holding company is an includable member of the unitary group
conducting business in the state. In a combined reporting state, the income of the
holding company (often substantial) is added to the pre-apportionment tax base of
the unitary group, and the factors of the holding company would be taken into
account in applying the apportionment formula.
In some cases, a unitary group may argue that its holding company is not part
of its unitary business. If that argument succeeds, then the income of the holding
company would not be included in the combined report."' That argument,
however, is often difficult for the taxpayer to win, due to the general presumption
that the activities of the members of a commonly controlled group are part of that
group's unitary business. 9 In addition, a unitary group attempting to keep the
income of a holding company out of the combined report by claiming that the
holding company's activities are unrelated to the unitary business may have
difficulty convincing a court that it had a legitimate business reason for engaging
in a license or other transaction with that holding company.2 °
C. Simplification
The transition from one tax regime to another typically involves some
complexity, even if the new system, once up and running, is significantly less
complex than the system it replaces. In some respects, a combined reporting
system would be more complicated to administer than Louisiana's current separate
reporting system. Overall, however, it would be simpler. In addition, both systems
have so many points of commonality that a transition to the new regime should not
present substantial problems for the tax department. Both systems, for example,
use formulary apportionment, both require a definition of a unitary business, and
both require an identification of "allocable" or "nonbusiness income"-that is,
income that a non-domiciliary state may not apportion by formula under U.S.
Supreme Court decisions.
The one major increase in administrative burden under combined reporting
arises from the need to audit members of a unitary group that were not taxable in
18. For discussion of whether a holding company is part of a unitary business, see Eric J. Coffill
& Clare M. Rathbone, "Unitary" Holding Companies: Uncertainty and Pitfalls Under Current
California Law, 6 State Tax Notes 757 (1994).
19. See e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 463 U.S. 159,103
S. Ct. 2983 (1983) (clear and cogentevidence required). For recent cases involving holding companies,
see Shaklee Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 738 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1998) (Japanese holding
company unitary with Shaklee); Extrusion Dies, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, Nos.94-I-1463,
94-1-1464 (Wis. Tax App. Comm'n Aug. 21, 1996) (corporation acting as a holding company and
owning stock in a subsidiary unable to deduct net losses because it lacked nexus with Wisconsin and
was not subject to the Wisconsin franchise tax).
20. As discussed infra in Part III.E., we recommend that Louisiana permit a water's edge
election, under which an enterprise conducting a unitary business partly in Louisiana could exclude
certain foreign corporations from the unitary group. In this situation, special anti-avoidance rules are
necessary to prevent use of foreign holding companies for tax avoidance purposes. See Part III.E. and
especially text at infra note 137.
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Louisiana. Assume, for example, that PCo operates a store exclusively in Louisiana
and its subsidiary, SCo, operates a store exclusively in Mississippi and that the two
operations are part of a unitary business. Under current law, SCo would not be
taxable in Louisiana and Louisiana would not need to audit SCo. Under combined
reporting, the unitary income ofboth companies must be reported to the Louisiana tax
department and apportioned by formula among the states where the unitary business
operates. The department must do whatever is appropriate in a voluntary compliance
system to make sure that the information provided to it is accurate.
The additional burden created by the increased audit coverage of corporations
that do not have nexus with Louisiana is offset, however, by eliminating the need to
pursue costly and complex investigations to monitor the type of tax-planning
opportunities discussed in Section H.B., above. Obviously the magnitude of the
administrative benefits derived, for example, from ending the tax benefits of holding
company tactics and improper transfer prices depends on the vigor with which the
department has pursued those schemes in the past. If the department has not been
diligent, the administrative benefits may be modest. In that event, however, the
revenue gains to the Louisiana treasury from adopting the combined reporting regime
are likely to be very substantial.
The biggest potential gain in simplicity from adopting combined reporting comes
from eliminating the need to police most intra-group transfer pricing practices.2
Determining the proper price on a transfer of property is often difficult for the
taxpayer and the tax department.' In the case of transfers of valuable intangible
property, the problem is particularly acute. In a separate reporting state like
Louisiana, a unitary group may use intercorporate transactions to shift profits from
Louisiana to a state with a lower effective tax rate.' Because those gambits do not
work under combined reporting, the tax department is spared the expense of
monitoring them for abuse.
21. Taxpayers would also enjoy some gains from simplification. One commentator, writing
during a period when separate accounting was commonly used, described it as so expensive to
implement that the bookkeeping costs could far exceed the tax due under formulary apportionment.
Charles W. Gerstenberg, Allocation of Business Income, 1931 Nat'l Tax Assoc. Proc. 301, 306.
22. Nearly every state allows its tax administration to adjust transfer prices to reallocate income
among companies in order to reflect income accurately. In some states, this power is more constrained
than that possessed by the IRS under I.R.C. § 482 (2001). The states seem to be getting more aggressive
in adjusting intercorporate pricing and related expenses. The courts have not always supported these
efforts. For recent cases, see SLI Int'l. Corp. v. Crystal, 671 A.2d 813 (Md. 1996); New York Times
Sales, Inc. v. Comm 'r of Rev., 667 N.E.2d 302 (Mass. 1996); Petition of Express, Inc., Nos. 812330,
812331,812332,812334,1995 N.Y. Tax Lexis 493 (N.Y. Tax App. Sept. 14, 1995);Aaron Rents, Inc.
v. Collins,No. D-96025 (Super. Ct., Fulton County,Ga., 1994); Comm 'rofRevenuev. AMlWoodbroke
Inc., 634 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1994); Trans-Lux Corp. v. Meehan, 652 A.2d 539 (Conn. 1993); Petition
ofBausch & Lomb, Inc., No. TSB-D-90(I I)C, 1990 N.Y. Tax Lexis 325 (N.Y. Tax App. July 19,1990);
Petition of Hilton Hotels Corp., 1989 N.Y. Tax Lexis 63 (Feb. 24,1989); Commonwealth v. General
Electric Co., 372 S.E.2d 599 (Mass. 1988). For a survey of these issues, see Mary Jane Egr,State
Section-482 7ype Authority, I I State Tax Notes 1547 (1996).
23. In planning a transaction at the state level, advisers cannot focus solely on the nominal tax
rates in the relevant states. The focus should be on the corporation's effective tax rate in each state.
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Consider for example, PCo, a parent corporation that manufactures widgets
in Louisiana. It sells the widgets to SCo, its subsidiary. SCo sells the widgets
in Washington, a state that does not have an income tax. PCo is taxable only in
Louisiana, and SCo is not taxed under Washington law, although Washington
has jurisdiction to impose an income tax. In a separate filing regime, PCo's
income depends on the price at which the widgets are sold to SCo. Because
Louisiana has a higher effective tax rate than Washington, the corporate group
is tempted to sell the widgets at the lowest defensible price. Indeed, if the
taxpayer doubts the ability of the Louisiana tax department to pursue transfer
pricing abuses effectively, it may arrange the sale to be made at what objectively
may be an indefensible price.24
In combating transfer pricing abuses, a separate filing state cannot expect
effective assistance from the Internal Revenue Service. Except in some very
special cases, a shift of income from one domestic corporation to another has no
impact on Federal tax liability. As a result, the Federal tax authorities have no
institutional obligation or incentive to police such shifting. The Internal
Revenue Service is properly concerned in some cases about the use of transfer
prices to shift income outside the United States to foreign entities. Its track
record in preventing transfer pricing abuses, however, is at best mixed,
notwithstanding its allocation of extensive resources to the issue.25
III. MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES OF A COMBINED REPORTING REGIME
In this part, we discuss the main building blocks of a combined reporting
system. Section III.A., below, describes the rules applicable in preparing a
combined report. In general, a combined report is an accounting of the total
income derived by a corporate group from the operation of its unitary business.
The corporations that participate in a unitary business, part of which is conducted
in the taxing state, must include their unitary income in the combined report of
that state.
Section III.B. describes the concept of a unitary business and discusses its
constitutional parameters. In general, a unitary business is a common enterprise
engaged in by one or more members of a group of affiliated entities. Louisiana
employs a unitary business concept, at least implicitly, under current law. We
suspect, however, that Louisiana has left the meaning of a unitary business fairly
24. Although the example in the text involved the sale of tangible personal property, the same
shifting of profits can occur using management fees, consulting fees, royalty payments, or interest
charges.
25. For a full discussion of the IRS efforts at preventingtransfer pricing abuses, see Michael J.
McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules of the United States ch. 6 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
McIntyre, Int'l Treatise]. For a comparison of the Federal rules on separate accounting and the state
rules on formulary apportionment, see Michael J. McIntyre, Contrasting Methodologies: A Systematic
Presentation of the Differences Between An Arm's-Length/Source-Rule System and a Combined-
Reporting/Formulary-Apportionment System, Proceedings of the 86th Annual Conference, National Tax
Association 226 (1994) (excerpted in Pomp & Oldman, State and Local, supra note 13, at I 1-142).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
undeveloped. To operate a combined reporting regime successfully, the State
will have to give greater attention to the concept. We offer some
recommendations at the end of this section on how Louisiana might define a
unitary business.
Section III.C. addresses issues that arise in distinguishing apportionable
business income from allocable income. In many states, allocable income is
referred to as nonbusiness income.'6 Louisiana does not use that latter term in its
tax statute. The name is not of any great importance. The substance of the
Louisiana definition of allocable income, however, differs in some significant
respects from the definition of nonbusiness income used by states that have
incorporated UDITPA into their tax code.
In a combined reporting regime, the portion of the apportionable income of a
unitary business that is taxable by a state is determined through application of an
apportionment formula. Louisiana currently employs an apportionment formula
in operating its separate reporting regime. That formula, in effect, apportions half
of the income of a manufacturing or merchandizing business to the place of
production and the other half to the place of sale. In Section III.D. we defend the
constitutional right of Louisiana to use that apportionment formula in a combined
reporting regime.
Section uI.E. addresses so-called "water's edge" rules. In principle, a
combined reporting regime should not recognize any geographical boundaries.
That is, the unitary income apportioned to Louisiana should be computed by
reference to the entire worldwide income of all members of the unitary combined
group. For practical and political reasons, however, we recommend that Louisiana
allow taxpayers to elect to exclude from their unitary group certain foreign
corporations that are not engaged directly in nexus-creating activities in the State.
A. The Combined Report
A combined report is an accounting document prepared on behalf of a group
of corporations engaged in a unitary business. It contains a tabulation of the
aggregate taxable income derived by the members of the group from that unitary
business. The initial step in preparing a combined report is to determine the scope
of the group's unitary business.17 In computing the aggregate taxable income of
group members from that unitary business, transactions between members of the
group generally are eliminated. 2s The combined report also includes a tabulation
of each group.member's apportionment factors used in the apportionment formula.
In most states, including Louisiana, the factors are property, payroll, and receipts
26. See UDIPTA, supra note 4, at § 1(e).
27. It is possible that some or all of the members of a group of entities would be engaged in more
than one unitary business. In that event, a combined report typically would be prepared for each unitary
business. For simplicity, our discussion in this part assumes that the combined group is engaged in only
one unitarybusiness. For discussion of issues arising when members of a combined group are engaging
in more than one unitary business, see infra Section III.B.3.
28. For discussion of this wash rule, see infra Part IV.C. I.
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(sales). The corporations that are included in a combined report are sometimes
referred to as a combined group or a unitary group. We use these terms
interchangeably in this Article. Although the combined report would be
appended to the tax return of each group member that has a tax-filing obligation
in Louisiana, it is not itself a tax return.
A combined reporting state requires the unitary group to use the combined
report to determine the amount of the group's taxable unitary income apportioned
to the state. That amount equals the aggregate taxable income of the group
multiplied by the group's apportionment percentage. The apportionment
percentage is determined by applying the apportionment formula. The
application of the formula is described in detail in Section III.D., below. If the
apportionment percentage is, for example, twenty-five percent, then twenty-five
percent of the aggregate taxable unitary income of the combined group would be
taxable in the state. The tax is not imposed, however, on the unitary group itself.
Rather, each member of the group having nexus with the state is made taxable on
its assigned share of the unitary income apportioned to the state under the
apportionment formula. Issues that arise in determining the amount taxable to
particular members of a unitary group are addressed in Part IV.A. 1., below.
To be included in the combined group, a corporation must be engaged in a
unitary business with the other members of that group. In addition, the
corporation must be controlled, directly or indirectly, by a common parent
corporation or by some consortium of related owners." States using combined
reporting generally determine control by reference to a minimum ownership of
voting stock.30
Some states using combined reporting define "control," for purposes of a
combined report, as common ownership of more than fifty percent of a
corporation's voting stock.31 For example, if PCo owns fifty-one percent of the
voting stock of SCo and the two corporations are engaged in a unitary business,
they would form a combined group.
29. Louisiana should specifically provide that a combined groupmay exist if the members are
owned by one or more individuals acting in concert. See Rain Bird Sprinkler Mfg. Corp., California
State Board of Equalization, June 27, 1984, 84-SBE-094 (upholding the tax department's position that
unity of ownership exists if a group of corporations is owned by members of a family); but see True v.
Hietkamp, State Tax Comm'r, 470 N.W.2d 582 (N.D. 1991) (upholding the tax department's position
that a unitary combined group must be controlled by a single entity that is a member of that group). As
a matter of tax policy, we agree with the result in Rain Bird and disagree with the result in True.
30. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25105(b)(West Supp. 2001). The Federal govemment has
given considerable attention to the issue of defining control for purposes of its controlled foreign
corporation rules. See I.R.C. § 958 (2001) (defining indirect and constructive ownership for purposes
of defining a controlled foreign corporation). Similar rules should be adopted by Louisiana in
determining ownership for purposes of a control test.
31. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25105(b)(l)and (2) (West Supp. 2001); Idaho Code §
63-3027B(b)(l)and (2) (Michie 2000). But see Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-101(28Xa)(2000) (defining a
unitary group as a group of corporations that are related through common ownership and are
economically interdependent). For a comparable definition of control under Federal tax law, see I.R.C.
§ 957(a) (2001) (defining a controlled foreign corporation).
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An issue that sometimes arises in defining a combined group is the proper
treatment of a company that is not itself engaged in an active business but simply
is holding stock in affiliated companies that are actively engaged in a unitary
business. Assume, for example, that PCo owns all of the stock of SCo and TCo
and that SCo and TCo are actively engaged in the same unitary business. PCo is
acting merely as a holding company and is not actively engaged in that unitary
business. Consistent with the goals of combined reporting, PCo should be treated
as a member of the combined group. California would treat PCo as a member of
the combined group under these circumstances.1
2
Having a strong control test that is not easily avoided is an important aspect
of a combined reporting regime. The more-than-fifty-percent stock-ownership rule
used by most states is a rule of statutory convenience, not a rule mandated by the
U.S. Constitution. We endorse that rule for Louisiana because of its familiarity and
wide acceptance. We would buttress the rule, however, by giving the Tax
Department the authority to include a corporation in a unitary combined group
when there is control in fact and a failure to include it would result in a distortion
of the income of the combined group.33 We also would endorse regulations that
would treat ownership of more than fifty percent of the value of stock34 as
establishing control and that would treat restrictions on transferability of stock as
indicia of control in appropriate cases.
35
A combined report is not a consolidated tax return.36 In a combined reporting
regime, each group member files its own tax return and pays tax on its determined
share of the unitary income of the combined group. In a consolidated return, a
single tax return is filed on behalf of all the members of the consolidated group.
A major difference between a state combined report and a Federal consolidated
return is that the consolidated return may be elected regardless of whether the
32. Cal. FTB Legal Ruling 95-7 (Nov. 29,1995); Cal. FTB Legal Ruling 95-8 (Nov. 29,1995).
33. SeeTreas. Reg. 1.957-1)(bX2)(as amended in 1997)("Anyarrangementto shiftformal voting
power.., will not be given effect if in reality voting power is retained"). The Federal government
defines control for purposes of adjusting intra-group prices without reference to any ownership
percentage. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(iX5) (1994). Two entities are presumed to be controlled if income
or deductions are artificially shifted between them. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(iX4) (1994). See also Idaho
Tax Regulation 63-3027C(b)(giving the tax commissioner authorityto include orexclude a corporation
from a combined group).
34. In defining a controlled foreign corporation,ownership of over 50 percent ofthe stock by vote
or value is sufficient to constitute control. I.R.C. § 957(a)(1) and (2) (2001).1 35. California has a "stapled stock" rule that treats two or more corporations as members of a
control group if over 50 percent of the shares of stock are "stapled" togetheras a result of restrictions
on their transfer.. The stock of two companies is stapled if a person acquiring a share of stock in one
corporation must also acquire a share of stock in the other corporation. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §
25105(bX3) (West Supp.2001). We endorse the California rule. For a related Federal stapled-stock
rule, see I.R.C. § 269B (2001) (treating a foreign corporation stapled to a U.S. corporation as a U.S.
corporation).
36. Under Federal rules, certain eligible corporations that are related to one another through
common ownership under an 80 percent-control test may elect to file a consolidated return rather than
separate returns. See I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505 (2001).
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included corporations conduct a unitary business." The state concept of a unitary
business, developed in part to deal with issues under the Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, has no federal counterpart in this context."
Combined reporting is a neutral accounting system that neither favors nor
penalizes the taxpayer or state. In some cases, a group of corporations may want to
include a particular corporation in their control group; in other cases, they may want
to exclude it from the group. Everything depends on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.
In general, a group of corporations would prefer combined reporting if one
member of their unitary combined group has suffered a loss and the loss otherwise
would not be useful to them. Consider, for example, PCo, a parent corporation with
nexus in Louisiana. PCo has a unitary subsidiary, SCo, that operates at a loss in
another state. PCo has income of $200 and SCo has a loss of $100. Under these
facts, PCo would pay tax to Louisiana on $200 in a separate reporting regime. In a
combined reporting regime, the pre-apportionment income of the unitary business
would be only $100, so PCo's apportioned income taxable in Louisiana would be no
more than $100.
Of course, a combined reporting regime may cause some combined groups to
pay higher aggregate taxes. For example, if PCo in the above example had the loss
of $100 and SCo had income of $200, PCo would not pay any tax in Louisiana in a
separate reporting regime. In a combined reporting regime, however, the combined
group of PCo and SCo would have pre-apportionment income of$ 100, some portion
of which would be apportioned to Louisiana under the apportionment formula.
Ifmultistate corporations were not engaging in tax planning to exploit defects in
Louisiana's separating reporting regime, the overall revenue impact of adopting
combined reporting probably would notbe substantial. Some corporate groups would
pay more and some would pay less, with the overall revenue impact uncertain. The
major effect of the reform would be a better measure of in-state income and some
simplification.39 In the world we live in, however, the adoption of combined
reporting would increase Louisiana tax revenues by reducing tax planning
opportunities.' Although we do not have data necessary to make a revenue estimate,
we expect that the revenue gains would be significant.4' Of course the Louisiana
legislature could adopt offsetting tax reductions if it wanted to make its overall reform
package revenue neutral.
37. See generally, William L. Goldman et al., 1130 T. M. Income Taxes: Consolidated Returns
and Combined Reporting (revised 2001).
38. Some states permit corporationsthat file-or could have filed-a federal consolidatedreturn
to file a similar state return. The taxpayer is not required to file a consolidated return; indeed, a
mandatory rule probably would be unconstitutional in some situations because the unitary business
principle both empowers and limits the tax jurisdiction of states.
39. See supra Parts II.A. and II.C.
40. See supra Part ll.B.
41. See Richard D. Pomp, The Future of the State Corporate Income Tax: Reflections' (and
Confessions) of a Tax Lawyer, in The Future of State Taxation 49, 64-65 (David Brunori ed. 1998)
[hereinafter Pomp, Future of State Taxation].
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The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), promulgated
in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association, contains no express statement on the use of combined
reporting.42 This silence is unfortunate, for UDITPA is the basic document used by
the states to promote uniform corporate tax rules.
Section 18 ofUDITIA does provide, inter alia, for "the employment of any other
method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's
income," if its rules on apportionment and allocation "do not fairly represent the
extent of the taxpayer's business activity in [the taxing] state." Some courts have
relied on Section 18 to uphold state regulations that require the use of combined
reports.' That street, however, is one way. Taxpayers generally have been
unsuccessful in invoking Section 18 to secure the right to file a combined return in the
absence of legislative authorization."
It makes no sense for Louisiana to adopt combined reporting unless the
combined reporting regime is mandatory. Indeed, Louisiana taxpayers already can
achieve the results of combined reporting by merging certain of their separate entities
into other members. This self-help approach typically involves some transaction costs
and other business obstacles that might outweigh the tax savings in some
circumstances. If combined reporting were elective rather than mandatory, these
costs and obstacles would be eliminated and the cost in revenue forgone by the
Louisiana treasury would increase. Moreover, elective combined reporting would do
nothing to reduce tax planning opportunities because taxpayers that are reducing their
taxes by gaming the current system would simply decline to make the election.
B. Defining a Unitary Business
In Section Ill.B.l. below, we discuss the ways in which the unitary business
concept both empowers and limits state taxing power. In Section III.B.2., we discuss
the major pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court on the unitary
business concept. In Section HI.B.3., we address issues arising when affiliated entities
engage in more than one unitary business. Section III.B.4. provides our practical
advice to Louisiana on how to define a unitary business.
42. See UDITPA, supra note 4.
43. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 395 N.E.2d 1167 (I1. 1979); Pioneer Container
Corp. v. Beshears, 684 P.2d 396 (Kan. 1984). For discussion, see Laura L. Farrell, The State of
Combined Reporting Today, 1 I State Tax Notes 635 (1996); 2000 Multistate Corporate Tax Guide at
1-533 to 1-550; 1-613 to 1-623 (J. Healy ed.).
44. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a constitutional right exists to file
a combined report. The taxpayer raised this issue in Mobil, but the Court did not address it on the
grounds that it was not presented in a timely manner. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont,
445 U.S. 425,441 n. 15,100 S. Ct. 1223,1233 (1980). The state courts have uniformly rejected taxpayer
arguments that they have a constitutional right to file a combined report. See, e.g., Ashland Pipe Line
Co. v. Marx, 623 So. 2d 995 (Miss. 1993). Some courts have rejected attempts by the tax administration
to impose a combined report if a statute did not explicitly authorize it. Polaroid Corp. v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 472 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1984); Sears Roebuck& Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 561 A.2d 172
(Me. 1989).
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1. Jurisdictional Issues
Under well-established constitutional doctrine, a state cannot tax a
corporation's income unless there is "some definite link, some minimum
connection" ' between the state and the corporation's income that the state seeks
to tax. This necessary connection or relationship is referred to as "nexus." Nexus
is present when the income of the corporation is attributable in a meaningful way
to the unitary business, part of which is conducted in the taxing state.
To tax the income of corporations in a combined reporting regime, therefore,
Louisiana must limit the reach of its tax to income having a nexus with the State.
According to the United States Supreme Court, the "linchpin of apportionability
in the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business principle." In the
Court's authoritative view, the income derived by a group of corporations from the
operation of a unitary business has nexus with all of the states in which that unitary
business is conducted. In sum, if a unitary business is being conducted in
Louisiana, the State may apportion all the income of that unitary business
regardless of where, why, how, or from what specific activities that income is
realized.
To illustrate the implications of the Court's doctrine, consider a corporation,
PCo, that conducts activities both within and without Louisiana. Louisiana
obviously would have nexus over the in-state activities and could tax PCo on some
portion of the income generated by those activities. Louisiana also would have
nexus to tax PCo on an apportioned share of the income generated by the out-of-
state activities if those activities had a sufficient relationship to the in-state
business."7 That relationship is established if the activities of PCo within and
without Louisiana are integrated, interdependent, or synergistic-that is, if the
activities of the enterprise constitute a unitary business."' The simple rule is that
45. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340,344-45,74 S. Ct. 535, 539 (1954).
46. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439, 100 S. Ct. at 1232.
47. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
48. For state cases interpreting and applying the concept of a unitary business, seeEarth
Resources Co. v. Alaska, Dept. of Revenue,665 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1983);Appeal of the Leland Corp.,
California State Board of Equalization,No. 94A-0916 (Feb. 5, 1997); Dental Ins. Consultants, Inc. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);Arizona Dept. ofRevenue v. TalleyIndus.,
893 P.2d 17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Pledger v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 812 S.W.2d 101 (Ark. 1991);
AMAX, Inc. v. Groppo, 550 A.2d 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988);McLean Gardens Corp. v. District of
Columbia, No. 3158-82 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 1983);Albertson"s Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Revenue, 683
P.2d 846 (Idaho 1984); Citizens Utils. Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 488 N.E.2d 984 (111. 1986); Super Value
Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 479 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1991); Texas Co. v. Cooper, 107 So. 2d
676 (La. 1958); Md. Comptroller of Treasury v. Diebold, 369 A.2d 77 (Md. 1977); Russell Stover
Candies, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue. 665 P.2d 198 (Mont. 1983); Cox Cablevision Corp. v. Dept. of
Revenue, No. 3003,1992 Ore. Tax Lexis 17 (Ore. Tax Ct. June 10, 1992);Homart Dev. Co. v. Norberg,
529 A.2d 115 (R.I. 1987); Exxon Corp. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n., 258 S.E.2d 93 (S.C. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 447 U.S. 917, 100 S. Ct. 3005(1980); CorningGlass Works, Inc. v. Va. Dept. of Taxation,
402 S.E.2d 35 (Va. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 900,112 S. Ct. 277 (1991); Interstate Finance Corp.
v. Wis. Dept. of Taxation, 137 N.W.2d 38 (Wis. 1965); see generally Franklin C. Latchamn, 11 1OT.M.,
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a taxing state may tax an apportioned share of the separately stated income
attributable to activities that otherwise may be viewed as occurring outside the
taxing state when those activities are a part of the unitary business conducted, in
whole or in part, within the taxing state.
The example above illustrates the application of the unitary-business principle
to a single corporation. The same principle applies, however, when two or more
corporations are preparing a combined report. Assume that PCo, in the example
above, organized a subsidiary, SCo, to conduct its out-of-state business activities.
That change in legal organization would not affect Louisiana's jurisdiction to tax
the income of SCo. SCo could be included in the combined report and its income
subject to Louisiana tax if its activities are integrated, interdependent, or synergistic
with the business of PCo.
A state is not permitted under the U.S. Constitution to tax all of the unitary
income of a member of the combined group with which it has nexus. A state is
only permitted to tax its apportioned share of that income.49 The issue of fair
apportionment is addressed in Section Ill.D.
2. Definitional Guidance from the US. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court has never attempted a rigorous, systematic definition
of a unitary business.' The Court has acknowledged that "the unitary business
concept is ... not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and any
number of them are logically consistent with the underlying principles motivating
the approach.""' Instead, it has identified some of the indicia of a unitary business.
Those indicia include the following:
(1) Unity of use and management; 2
IncomeTaxes: Definitionofa Unitary Business (revised 2001) [hereinafter Latcham, Unitary Business].
49. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,358 U.S. 450,460,79 S. Ct. 357,363
(1959) ("[T]he entire net income of a corporation,generated by interstate as well as intrastate activities,
may be fairly apportioned among the States for tax purposes by formulas utilizing in-state aspects of
interstate affairs.").
50. The unitary business principle grew out of the "unit rule" of the late 19th century, which was
used for apportioning theproperty tax of railroads, telegraph and express companies. Under the unit
rule, the value of the entire enterprise was first determined and then apportioned to a taxingjurisdiction
through the use of a formula. Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 778-79,112 S. Ct. at 2258-59. See Elcanon
lsaacs, The Unit Rule, 35 Yale L.J. 838 (1926). The unit rule respected the self-evident reality that the
value of an assembled whole may be greater than the value of the individual elements that constituted
the interconnected system being taxed. The Supreme Court at one point made the observation in
defense of the unit rule that "[clonsidered as distinct subjects of taxation, a horse is, indeed, a horse;
a wagon, a wagon; a safe, a safe; a pouch, a pouch; but how is it that $23,430worth of horses, wagons,
safes and pouches produces $275,446 in a single year?. . . The answer is obvious." Adams Express
Company v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 222-23, 17 S. Ct. 305, 310 (1897).
51. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. ofCalifornia,463 U.S. 159,167,103 S. Ct.
2983, 2941 (1983).
52. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501,508,62 S. Ct. 701,704 (1942).
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(2) A concrete relationship between the out-of-state and the in-state
activities that is established by the existence of a unitary business;"
(3) Functional integration, centralization of management, economies of
scale; s4
(4) Substantial mutual interdependence; 5 and
(5) Some sharing or exchange of value not capable of precise identification
or measurement-beyond the mere flow of funds arising out of a passive
investment or a distinct business operation.'
Whether the activities of one member of a corporate group are related to the
business of another member of that group can depend on how that latter
corporation's business is described. A corporation's business can be described
in many ways, from the most specific to the most general. For example, assume
that PCo manufactures widgets for use in the aerospace industry and that SCo,
its subsidiary, manufactures widgets for the automotive industry. If PCo's
business is described very specifically as conducting a unitary business of
manufacturing widgets for the aerospace industry, then the activities of SCo
might not appear to be related to that business.57
Moving to a slightly higher level of generality, PCo's unitary business might
be described as manufacturing widgets. Under that definition, SCo's activities
would more likely be considered to be unitary with PCo's business. Even more
generally, PCo's unitary business might be described as a manufacturer. In that
event, the activities of all of PCo's manufacturing subsidiaries might be unitary
with PCo's business. On the highest level of generality, PCo could be described
as in the business of allocating its resources to maximize its internal rate-of-
return. At that level of generality, any activities of a subsidiary of PCo might be
unitary with PCo's business. The United States Supreme Court, in Allied-
Signal,"8 rejected the highest level of generality.59 It almost certainly would
53. Container, 463 U.S. at 166, 103 S. Ct. at 2940.
54. Mobil.Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425,438, 100 S. Ct. 1223,1232
(1980).
55. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354,371,102
S. Ct. 3128, 3139 (1982).
56. Container, 463 U.S. at 166, 103 S. Ct. at 2940. For a detailed treatment of the definition of
a unitary business, see Latcham, Unitary Business, supra note 48.
57. We certainly are not suggesting by this example and those that follow that similarity of the
actual products being sold determines whether two separate entities are in a unitary relationship.
Califomia has recognized that businesses diverse in what they sell can be in a unitary relationship. See
Mole Richardson Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 269 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1990) (rental of lighting for Hollywood
and Colorado ranching held to be unitary).
58. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
59. In defending its broad characterization of the business of Allied Signal,New Jersey did little
to help the Court see that selecting the appropriate level of generality in defining a unitary business is
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reject the most limiting extreme as well. In the middle is the grey area where law
suits are won and lost.
The Court has asserted that it "will, ifreasonably possible, defer to the judgment
of state courts in deciding whether a particular set of activities constitutes a 'unitary
business."' The Court has declared that "our task must be to determine whether the
state court applied the correct standards to the case; and ifit did, whether its judgment
'was within the realm ofpermissiblejudgment."I' Some decisions suggest, however,
that the Court will not actually apply its professed standard.62
Whether income is part of the unitary business cannot be determined by the label
attached to it. For example, dividends, interest, or capital gains cannot automatically
be assumed to be nonbusiness income. Similarly, rental income may not necessarily
constitute business income. Whether an item of income should be included in the
apportionable unitary business income of a corporation depends on the relationship
of that item to the business being conducted in the taxing state. For example, if a
corporation holds its working capital in a bank account, interest paid on this account
would be part of the corporation's unitary business income because of its integral
relationship to the corporation's business operations.'
3. Multiple Unitary Businesses
A corporate group, or even a single company, may simultaneously conduct more
than one unitary business. In some cases, only one of these unitary businesses would
have activities in the taxing state. In such a case, Louisiana should tax an apportioned
share of the income from the unitary business that is conducted in part within the
State. The corporate group would determine the taxable income of that unitary
business and would apply the apportionment formula using only the property, payroll
and receipts (sales) factors relating to that unitary business.
As an illustration, assume that a corporate group owns a chain of gas stations
in Louisiana and Missouri and a chain of pharmacies in Arkansas and Mississippi."
an application of a more pervasive problem in the law. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Levels of Generality
in Constitutionallnterpretation:LiberatingAbstractons, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1992); Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057
(1990); Richard D. PompIssues in the Design of FormularyApportionmentin the Context ofNAFTA,
49 Tax L. Rev. 795, 802-03 (1995) [hereinafter Pomp, NAFTA]; Pomp & Oldman, State and Local,
supra note 13, atIO-21.
60. Container, 463 U.S. at 175, 103 S. Ct. at 2945.
61. Id. at176,103S. Ct. at2946.
62. SeeAllied-Signal,504 U.S. 768,112 S. Ct. 2251(1992). Fordiscussionsee BenjaminMiller,
Allied-Signal-A Cursory Examination, 2 State Tax Notes 888 (1992).
63. See Richard D. Pomp & Rebecca S. Rudnick, Federal Tax Concepts as a Guide for State
Apportionment of Dividends: Life After ASARCO, 18 Tax Notes 411 (1982) (excerpted in Pomp &
Oldman, State and Local, supra note 13, at 11-67); Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 787, 789, 112 S. Ct. at
2263, 2264. Louisiana currently deviates from the general principle that the label attached to a
corporation'sbusiness income should not control the way it is taxed. Louisiana does not treat dividends
and interest as apportionable income even if the income is related to a unitary business. For discussion
of the treatment of allocable income under Louisiana law, see Section III.C.
64. See Pomp, NAFTA, supra note 59, at 802-03.
[Vol. 61
2001] MICHAEL MCINTYRE, PA ULL MINES, & RICHARD POMP 721
Assume the corporate group is considered to be conducting two separate and
independent unitary businesses. Louisiana and Missouri would apply formulary
apportionment to determine their share of the income of the gas stations, and
Arkansas and Mississippi would apply formulary apportionment to determine their
respective shares of the income of the pharmacies. Louisiana and Missouri would
not include the income from the pharmacies in the corporate group's combined
report, and the factors attributable to that operation would not enter into the
apportionment formula.6 Similarly, Arkansas and Mississippi would not include
the income from the gas stations in the corporate group's combined report, and the
factors attributable to the gas station business would not enter into the
apportionment formula. Some method akin to separate accounting should be used
to determine the separate incomes of the pharmacy business and the gas station
business.
A corporation might conduct two unitary businesses, each of which was
conducted in Louisiana. In this case, Louisiana should calculate the taxable income
of each unitary business separately. It would then apply a separate apportionment
formula for each of the businesses.
4. Some Specific Recommendations
In adopting a combined reporting system, we recommend that Louisiana adopt
as broad a definition of a unitary business as the Court's Due Process and
Commerce clause jurisprudence allows. In our view, it is consistent with that
jurisprudence to define a unitary business as a common enterprise undertaken by
one or more commonly controlled entities in pursuit of business profits. Evidence
that a commonly controlled entity is engaged in a common enterprise would
include:
(1) that the participants in the enterprise contribute or are expected to
contribute in a nontrivial way to each other's profitability;
(2) that it is sharing or exchanging value with other participants in the
enterprise;
65. The appropriate function of an apportionment factor is to measure the business activities in
a taxing state relative to the business activities in the other states where the unitary business is
conducted. When an apportionment factor is being used in two unitary businesses, the question arises
as to how much of the value of that factor should be included in the apportionment formula of each
business. One possibility would be to bifurcate the factor and allocate it between the two businesses.
For example, if an employee spends forty percent of his time on one unitary business and sixty percent
of his time on the other unitary business, it would seem appropriate to include forty percent of his salary
in the payroll factor of the first business and sixty percent in the payroll factor of the other business.
In other circumstances, bifurcating the factor may be inappropriate. For example, if an asset provides
full benefits to both businesses without any diminution in the value to either business from the dual use,
then it may be appropriate to include the full value of the factor in the apportionment formula of each
business.
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(3) that the prices it charges or is charged on transfers of assets or services
to other participants in the enterprise are inconsistent with the arm's
length principle;'
(4) that it is dependent on other participants in the enterprise or one or
more of those participants is dependent on it for achieving some nontrivial
business objectives;
(5) that its functions are integrated with the functions of one or more
participants in the enterprise;
(6) that its activities are managed by some central authority of the
enterprise; or
(7) that it offers some economies of scale or economies of scope that
benefit the enterprise.
To avoid becoming enmeshed in disputes over the interpretation of particular
court decisions, we have formulated our list of the evidentiary determinants of a
unitary business without invoking the "magic" phrases that courts sometimes use
to summarize their views on the unitary business concept. The court-approved
phrases are intended to serve as a summary of the holdings of their prior decisions.
Our listing is more suggestive of the legal and economic analysis required to
determine the existence and scope of a unitary business.
By employing a definition of a unitary business that is co-extensive with its
taxing power under the United States Constitution, Louisiana improves its chances
of making substance rather than form control the treatment of unitary businesses.
A broad definition provides less opportunities for manipulation by taxpayers and
by the tax department and results in lower compliance costs for everyone.
In particular, we strongly recommend that Louisiana explicitly provide, by
statute or authorized regulations, that holding companies may be included in a
combined report even if their activities are primarily passive. We are concerned
with two types of holding companies. The first, and most important, is a company
that holds assets, such as trademarks and patents, that are used by the unitary
business. As discussed in Part II.B., the courts are unlikely to allow a group of
affiliated companies to exclude such a holding company from its combined report.
To avoid litigating risks, nevertheless, we recommend that this important point be
clarified in the statute or regulations. A rule requiring that holding companies be
included in a combined report is consistent with constitutional standards.
The second type of holding company is a parent company that owns a
controlling interest in two or more affiliated companies engaged in the same
unitary business. As indicated in Section III.A., we believe that such a holding
66. The fact that affiliates set their transfer prices in accord with the arm's length principle does
not negate in any way the existence of a unitary business. See Exxon Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue of
Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207, 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
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company should be included in the unitary group with its affiliated companies, even
if its activities are essentially passive.67 This rule is often helpful to the taxpayer,
although the overall revenue implications of the rule are not likely to be large. In
large measure, the rule simply removes a trap for unwary taxpayers that have not
received good tax planning advice.
Although we favor a broad definition of a unitary business, we obviously
recommend against a definition that would go beyond constitutional bounds. Some
states have adopted taxing statutes that subject corporations to tax on an apportioned
share of all of their income, regardless of the relationship of that income to the state.6
These states, known as full apportionment states, would violate the Court's nexus
holdings if they tax income generated by activities having no relationship to the
state.' Not only do these states make their tax statutes subject to constitutional attack,
they also lose whatever presumption the Court is willing to indulge that the state's
determination of nexus is "within the realm of permissible judgment."70
We recommend that Louisiana adopt several rebuttable presumptions that would
apply in establishing the existence of a unitary business. The goal of these
presumptions is to treat income as part of a unitary business whenever that treatment
is consistent with constitutional standards. Our proposed presumptions make clear
that in the absence of any proof that a unitary relationship is lacking, a challenge,
whether by the taxpayer or the state, against the presumption will fail.7 We prefer
that the presumptions be included in authorized regulations rather than in the tax
statute so that they may be fine tuned by the tax department in light of its experience
in administering a combined reporting regime.
In some cases, a presumption favoring the existence of a unitary business may
be helpful to the taxpayer. In other cases, the presumption is likely to encourage
taxpayers to volunteer information that will help the state determine whether a unitary
business exists. Experience teaches that a non-cooperative taxpayer can make things
difficult when a state engages in discovery. The use of presumptions may help
overcome taxpayer recalcitrance and obstinacy.
We recommend that Louisiana consider adopting the following four
presumptions:
(1) A taxpayer or corporate group is presumed to be engaged in a unitary
business when all of its activities are in the same general line;
67. See text at supra note 32.
68. See, e.g.,Conn.Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-218(West2000); Md. Tax-Gen. §§ 10-401,402(1997);
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:10E-6, 54:10A-6 (West Supp. 2001); I. Gen. Laws § 44-11-14(1999).
69. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
70. ContainerCorp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Bd. ofCalifornia,463 U.S. 159,176,103 S. Ct.
2983, 2946 (1983).
71. A presumption against the taxpayer has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See id.
at 164, 103 S. Ct. at 2939-40. "[T]he taxpayer has the distinct burden of showing by clear and cogent
evidence that [the state tax] results in extraterritorial values being taxed." Id. at 175,103 S. Ct. at 2945(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio StateAuditor, 165
U.S. 194, 227,17 S. Ct. 305,311 (1897) ("Presumptively all the property of the corporation or company
is held and used for the purposes of its business ....").
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(2) A taxpayer or corporate group is presumed to be engaged in a unitary
business when its various divisions, segments, branches, or affiliates are
engaged in different steps in a vertically structured enterprise;
(3) A taxpayer or corporate group that might otherwise be considered as
engaged in more than one unitary business is presumed to be engaged in
one unitary business when there is a strong central management, coupled
with the existence of centralized departments or affiliates for such
functions as financing, advertising, research, or purchasing; and
(4) A taxpayer operating different business segments within the
organizational structure of the single business entity is generally presumed
to be engaged in a single unitary business with respect to the business
segments.
Another set ofpresumptions should address when a newly-formed or acquired
business would be considered as part of the unitary business of the corporation that
formed or acquired it."2 Based on our involvement with the Multistate Tax
Commission's Public Participation Working Group on the Definition of a Unitary
Business, 3 we believe that the following presumptions are desirable and are likely
to meet the legitimate expectations of state tax administrators and corporate
taxpayers:
(1) Newly-acquired corporations. When a corporation acquires
another corporation, a presumption should exist against a finding of unity
between the two corporations during the first year. Any party may rebut
such presumption by proving that the corporations were unitary." If the
presumption is rebutted, the corporations shall be considered unitary as
of the date of acquisition, unless the evidence shows that unity was
established as of another date.
(2) Newly-formed corporations. When a corporation forms another
corporation, a presumption should exist in favor of finding unity between
the two corporations as of the date of formation. Any party may rebut
such presumption by proving that the corporations were not unitary or that
unity was established as of a later date."
In addition to the presumptions noted above, Louisiana should adopt a
presumption that the tax department's determination of whether a taxpayer is
72. These presumptions are not suitable for statutoryenactment but instead should be included
in authorized regulations.
73. Information on the PPWG and on the Definition of a Unitary Business is available online at
<http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/ppwgIist.html> (last visited May 14, 2001).
74. An instant unitaryrelationship mightbe established, for example, when the acquired company
was previously an unaffiliated supplier to, or buyer from, the acquiring unitary business.
75. A newly formed affiliate might lack instant unity when the new affiliate was a separate
business that had no ties to the existing business of the unitary business.
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engaged in a unitary business is correct if the taxpayer unreasonably refuses to
provide information pertinent to the determination of a unitary business. The
taxpayer should not be allowed to use any of the unfurnished information that was
covered by the request of the tax department to rebut that presumption at a later
date.76
C. Apportionable and Allocable Income
A combined reporting regime applies only to income derived from a unitary
business. That income is apportioned among the various states where the unitary
business is conducted. Unitary business income subject to apportionment is
referred to as "business income" or "apportionable income." The Louisiana tax
statute uses the term apportionable income." Income that does not constitute
apportionable income is referred to as "nonbusiness income" or "allocable
income." Allocable income is the term of choice in the Louisiana statute. 7
Allocable income is allocated to a single state without apportionment.
The states have not developed uniform practices on the treatment of allocable
income. One very common approach, however, is to treat allocable income as the
residual category and to apply allocation rules to income that does not constitute
the unitary business income of the taxpayer.79 This approach has been adopted by
UDITPA.a Interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and certain capital gains are
examples of income that sometimes can qualify as allocable income under this
approach. All of these types of income, nevertheless, could constitute business
income in many circumstances.
A less common approach, followed by Louisiana, designates certain categories
of income as allocable income, regardless of whether the income in those
categories arose from business activities. Typical examples of income subject to
this rule include interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and certain capital gains.8" In
Louisiana, allocable income is limited to most interest and dividend income, 2
76. For an analogous Federal rule, see I.R.C. § 982 (2001) (prohibiting a taxpayer that fails to
comply with a formal document request without reasonable cause from later using the requested
document in a court of law to resist a tax assessment).
77. La. R.S. 47:287.92(A) (2001) ("items of gross income, not otherwise exempt, shall be
segregated into two general classes designated as allocable income and apportionable income").
78. Id.
79. The definition of unitary-business income is addressed in supra Section I1,B.
80. UDITPA, supra note 4, at § I (e) ("'Non-business income' means all income other than
business income.').
81. The rules allocating these categories of allocable income will vary, depending on the income
at issue. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1903 (1995); La. R.S. 47:287.91-.93 (2001); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 5733.051 (West 1995). States that define allocable income in terms of income categories
typically adopted their statutes in the distantpast, when the constitutional landscape was quite different.
In those earlier times, allocation was thought to be appropriate for interest, dividends, rents, and
royalties because they formed "no part of the trading profit and do not need to be apportioned by
formula, since they can readily be specifically allocated to their proper sources." Report of the
Committee of the NTA on Allocation of Income, 1939 NTA Annual Conference 190,207.
82. La. R.S. 47:287.93(AX4) (2001). In 1993, Louisiana adopted a special apportionment rule
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certain rents and royalties from tangible real and personal property, 3 royalties from
intangible property, income from construction and repair services, and income
from estates, trusts, and partnerships."
We recommend in Section III.B.4., that a unitary business be defined as
broadly as the Court's current constitutional jurisprudence allows. Consistent with
this recommendation, corporate income should be subject to apportionment unless
that income has no nexus with the states in which the corporation is engaging in a
unitary business. Because a corporation's income is either apportionable income
or allocable income, our broad definition of apportionable income results in a
narrow definition of allocable income. By defining apportionable income as
broadly as the United States Supreme Court allows, a state simplifies the
administration of its tax and substantially reduces opportunities for tax avoidance.
The approach that we recommend is consistent with UDITPA but is not
compelled by UDITPA. By defining nonbusiness income as income other than
business income, however, UDITPA certainly suggests that business income is the
primary category and nonbusiness income is the subordinate category. 5
Our recommendation, however, goes beyond UDITPA. Under UDITPA,
business income is defined as "income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes income from
tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
operations. ' This language has been interpreted by some state courts as requiring
a positive showing that an income item arose from normal business activities to be
categorized as business income. 7 Under our view, any income having a nexus with
a taxpayer's business would constitute business income subject to apportionment.
An item of income would be classified as nonbusiness income only if the taxpayer
established that the income did not have a nexus with its business or if there were
a compelling reason why apportionment would not reach an appropriate result.
for certain dividend and interest income received by a corporation from a controlled subsidiary. La.
R.S. 47:287.94(IXI) and (2) (2001). Under the 1993 amendment, interest paid by a subsidiary on
indebtedness having a situs in Louisiana generally would be apportionedpro rata to the payer's real and
tangible personal property within and without Louisiana. A dividend from a subsidiary would be
apportioned pro rata to the place where the profits out of which the dividend was paid had arisen. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the 1993 amendment violated Article III, Section 2 of the Louisiana
Constitution, which prohibits the legislature from levyinga new tax in an odd-numbered year. See Dow
Hydrocarbons& Resources v. John Neely Kennedy, et al., 694 So. 2d 215 (La. 1997). With the demise
of the 1993 amendment, the pre-1993 allocation rule applies.
83. The statutory phrase is "corporeal movable property."
84. La. R.S. 47: 287.92(B) (2001).
85. For development of the concept of nonbusiness income as residual and subordinate to the
concept ofunitary-business income, see Michael J. McIntyre, ConstitutionalLimitations on State Power
to Combat TaxArbitrage: An Evaluationofthe Hunt- Wesson Case, 18/1 State Tax Notes 51,63-64 (Jan.
3, 2000) (reprinted 86/14 Tax Notes 1907-1922 (Mar. 27, 2000)).
86. UDITPA, supra note 4, § 1(a); Multistate Tax Commission Allocation and Apportionment
Regulations, Reg. IV.I (adopted February 21, 1973, as revised through July 30, 1993) [hereinafter
MTC].
87. See Pomp & Oldman, State & Local, supra note 13, at 10-28.
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Our recommendation also goes beyond the definition of business income
contained in a regulation that was under study in the mid- 1990s by the Multistate
Tax Commission." That draft regulation attempted to modernize UDITPA's
definition of business and nonbusiness income without the necessity of amending
UDITPA. The draft regulation interprets the UDITPA definition of business
income as containing a transactional test and a functional test.
Under the transactional test, business income includes only income arising
from transactions and activity in the regular course of business. Under the
functional test, business income also includes income arising from the acquisition,
management, and disposition of property that constitutes an integral part of the
taxpayer's regular trade orbusiness. Some critics of the MTC regulation assert that
the MTC has read the UDITPA definition of business income too broadly.s No
one can fairly argue, however, that a state employing those two tests would be
taxing extraterritorial values in violation of the United States Constitution.
Louisiana has not adopted UDITPA and is not constrained by its language in
fashioning its definitions of apportionable income and allocable income. On most
issues, we recommend that Louisiana follow UDITPA in order to contribute to
more uniform state corporate taxing statutes. Tax professionals fully understand,
however, that the UDITPA definition of business income is not an exemplar of
clarity and therefore has failed as an instrument of uniformity. It currently is an
instrument of complexity, confusion, and wasteful litigation.
To understand the logic of our recommendation, it is useful to review
UDITPA's treatment of allocable income. Under UDITPA, allocable dividend and
interest income is allocated to the taxpayer's state of commercial domicile." The
same rule applies to allocable gains derived from the sale of stock, bonds, and other
intangible property, such as patents, copyrights, and knowhow.9" It also applies in
some cases to allocable rental and royalty income derived from tangible personal
property and intangible property and to allocable capital gains from the sale of
tangible personal property.92
When UDITPA was drafted, a domiciliary state was expected to tax-and
generally did tax-all income allocated to it. The drafters of UDITPA did not
invent novel rules but simply codified and standardized existing state practices, to
avoid duplicative taxation, among other things.93 In the world we live in, however,
88. Multistate Tax Commission Allocation and Apportionment Regulations (Integrating
Amendment regarding Classification of Income as Business or Nonbusiness-April 1995 Proposal),
available at <http://www.mtc.gov/uniformBusnonbs.pdf> (visited May 5, 2001).
89. The Supreme Court of California disagrees.See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board, 22 P.3d 324 (Cal. 2001) (holding that the California statutory definition of business income,
which "mirrors" the UDITPA definition, establishes separate transactional and functional tests and that
the reversion to the taxpayer of surplus pension plan assets satisfies only the latter test).
90. UDITPA, supra note 4, at § 7. A common definition of "commercial domicile" is the place
from which the business is directed or managed. UDITPA, supra note 4, at § 1(b).
91. Id. at § 6(c).
92. UDITPA, supra note 4, at §§ 5(b), 6(b), 8.
93. George N. Carlson et. al., Perspectives on the Reform of UDITPA, in State Taxation of
Business: Issues and Policy Options (Thomas F. Pogue ed. 1992).
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income allocated to a domiciliary state has become untaxed income much of the
time. Connecticut and New York, for example, which serve as the commercial
domiciles for many of the Fortune 500 companies, have very generous rules on the
taxation of dividends, capital gains, and interest.0' In this environment, the
UDITPA rule on allocable income fosters manipulative tax avoidance and harmful
tax competition-lessons not lost on America's largest companies.
In principle, the problem created by the disinclination of domiciliary states to
tax income allocated to them might be mitigated by allocating that income to a
jurisdiction more inclined to tax it.95 Given the constitutional requirements of
nexus, however, states may not always be able to allocate nonbusiness income to
a state with the power and inclination to tax many important categories of income.%
For that reason, we recommend that Louisiana address the problem by defining
allocable income as narrowly as the United States Supreme Court will allow.
To adopt the strategy we recommend, Louisiana would not need to make
radical changes in its treatment of allocable income. The current definition is
already narrower in most respects than the UDITPA definition, and all income not
fitting that definition is classified as apportionable income. Some income treated
as allocable income, moreover, is allocated under current law to a state that would
have the power and inclination to tax it. The one necessary change-
constitutionally required whether or not Louisiana adopts combined reporting- is
a broadening of the current definition of allocable income to include income of
whatever type if the taxpayer demonstrates that it has no nexus with the state.
D. Formulary Apportionment of Income
Almost all states that have a corporate income tax apportion income to their
state by using an apportionment formula.' States following the UDITPA rule
apportion business income using an evenly-weighted three-factor formula. Those
three factors are property, payroll, and sales." Louisiana includes in the "sales"
94. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-217(aXI) (2000); N.Y. Tax Law § 209(9) (1998).
95. Allocation rules are a type of source rule. One hallmark of a good source rule is that it locates
income in a jurisdiction that is willing and able to tax it. See McIntyre, Int'l Treatisesupra note 25,
at § 3/C.4. Under this standard, the UDITPA allocation rules are defective.
96. Intangible assets and income from such assets are not easily located in a specific state except
through legal fictions. One old doctrine, known as mobilia sequunturpersonam, treats intangibles as
being attached to the person that owns the intangible. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Com. of Penn.,
141 U.S. 18, II S. Ct. 876 (1891); St. Louis v. Ferry, 78 U.S. 423 (1870). That doctrine may be the
source of the domiciliary rule of UDITPA thatwe have criticized. The Supreme Court has described
that doctrine as falling into desuetude. Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434, 442,99 S. Ct. 1813,1818 (1979). See
also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425,445, 100 S. Ct. 1223,1235 (1980)
("the maxim mobilia sequunturpersonam, upon which these fictions ofsitus are based, 'states a rule
without disclosing the reasons for it").
97. Mississippi uses separate accounting more than most states. Miss. Code Ann. §
27-7-23(c)(2)(BXiii) (1999).
98. UDITPA, supranote 4, at §§ 10-17. The evenly weighted, three-factor formula is known as
the Massachusetts formula, presumably because the drafters of UDITPA used that State's law as its
model. Massachusetts has abandoned an evenly-weighted three-factor formula, moving first to a double-
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factor other receipts not generally considered to be sales receipts." To avoid
confusion, this Article sometimes refers to what UDITPA labels the "sales" factor
as the "receipts (sales)" factor. In some states, this factor is referred to as the
"revenue" factor.'"
Probably the most common deviation from the UDITPA apportionment
formula is the use of a formula that double-weights the receipts (sales) factor.'10
The effect of the double-weighted receipts formula for manufacturing and
merchandising businesses is to apportion roughly half of the apportionable income
to the market state0 2 and the remaining half to the production state. For
manufacturing and merchandising businesses, Louisiana uses the double-weighted
receipts formula."0 3 It uses a two-factor formula for certain transportation
businesses," 4 service businesses,"' 5 and loan businesses.'" It uses the UDITPA
three-factor formula as the default rule for the remaining businesses.'"
Contrary to popular belief, income apportionment does not involve an inquiry
into the geographical location of income. The reason is that income, by its very
nature, has no geographical place. It is a number, calculated by adding and
subtracting other numbers. A number is a quantity that has shed its accidental
properties of time, place, color, and so forth. This abstraction from all accidental
properties other than quantity is a prerequisite to mathematical manipulation. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has noted in one of its more pellucid pronouncements on
income apportionment, dividing up income according to its geographical attributes
is like "slicing a shadow."'"
A virtue of apportionment by formula is that it can associate income with
factors that can be located geographically. The locations of the three items in the
typical apportionment formula-property, payroll, and sales-are not always
unambiguous. Reasonable rules can be devised, nevertheless, for resolving or
sidestepping those ambiguities. For example, many states exclude intangible
assets, such as stock, bonds, copyrights, and goodwill, from the property factor due
to the obvious difficulty of determining the physical location of an asset that has
no physical attributes. In addition, many intangible assets benefit all aspects of a
unitary business, and it would be folly in such circumstances to locate these
weighted receipts factor and most recently to a one-factor receipts formula for certain industries.
99. La. R.S. 47:287.95(FXIXc) (2001).
100. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-22-303(4Xa) (2000).
101. See, e.g., 1993 Cal. Stat. 946; Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25128 (West 2001).
102. This statement assumes the nearly uniformpractice of the states in assigning sales of tangible
personal property to the state where the goods are delivered. See UDITPA, supra note 4, at § 16. We
do not address in this Article the issue of how the place of sale should be determined on the sale of
intangible property or services.
103. La. R.S. 47:287.95(FX2) (2001).
104. La. R.S. 47:287.95(A)(C) (2001).
105. La. R.S. 47:287.95(D) (2001).
106. La. R.S. 47:287.95(E) (2001).
107. La. R.S. 47:287.95(FXI) (2001).
108. ContainerCorp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 463 U.S. 159,192,103 S. Ct.
2983, 2954 (1983).
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intangibles for apportionment purposes on the basis of legal fictions. Based upon
similar considerations, some states exclude receipts from the sale of intangible
property from the sales factor."°
In applying an apportionment formula to calculate its tax obligations under
current Louisiana law, a non-domiciliary corporation performs the following
steps:''
0
First, it calculates its apportionable worldwide taxable income under
Louisiana law. This amount represents a corporation's pre-apportionment
income.
Second, the corporation calculates its apportionment percentage by
applying the appropriate apportionment formula. Only factors that helped
generate the pre-apportionment income enter into the formula.
Third, the corporation multiplies its pre-apportionment income, calculated
in the first step, by the apportionment percentage calculated in the second
step. The resulting amount is the corporation's taxable income
apportioned to Louisiana.
Fourth, the corporation applies the Louisiana rate schedule to determine
its tentative tax due. The Louisiana tax rates are graduated, with income
in the first bracket taxed at four percent and income in the top bracket
taxed at eight percent."'
Fifth, it reduces its tentative tax by any allowable tax credits.
In a combined reporting regime, the first three steps outlined above would be
modified in two respects. First, the computation of pre-apportionment income
would be made for the entire combined group, not separately for each member of
that group. Second, the apportionment formula would be applied using the
aggregate factors of the combined group and the aggregate taxable income of the
combined group.
Louisiana's apportionment formula applicable to manufacturing and
merchandising business uses three fractions-the property fraction, the payroll
fraction, and the receipts (sales) fraction. In each of those fractions, the numerator
would be the relevant aggregate Louisiana factors for the combined group and the
denominator would be the relevant aggregate worldwide factors for that group.
For example, assume that PCo and its subsidiary, SCo, are engaged in a unitary
business in Louisiana. PCo manufactures 100 widgets in Louisiana at a unit cost
109. MTC, supra note 86, Reg. IV.18.(c).(3).
110. This list is provided for illustrative purposes and is not intended to be exhaustive. In addition,
the text does not address the treatment of allocable income.
111. La. R.S. 47: 287.12 (2001). The use of progressive corporate rates, like those used by
Louisiana, is criticized in Richard D. Pomp, Reforminga State CorporateIncome Tax, 51 Alb. L. Rev.
375, 484-508 (1987).
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of $40 and sells the widgets to SCo for $50 each. SCo sells thirty widgets to
unrelated customers in Louisiana and sells the remaining seventy widgets to
unrelated customers in Texas. SCo has a distribution cost for each sale of $30. All
of SCo's sales are made at a unit price of $100. In step one, PCo and SCo would
compute the pre-apportionment income for their combined group. In making that
computation, the intra-group sales from PCo to SCo would be ignored. The gross
receipts of the combined group would be $10,000 (100 unit sales x $100 unit sales
price). From that amount, the combined group would deduct PCo's costs of $4,000
(100 units x $40 unit production costs) and SCo's sales costs of $3,000 (100 unit
sales x $30 unit sales costs). Thus the pre-apportionment income of the combined
group would be $3,000 ($10,000 - $4,000 - $3,000).
To do the calculations required in step two, some assumptions must be made
about the property and payroll of PCo and SCo."I Assume that PCo has property
of $900, located entirely in Louisiana. It has payroll of $2,000, all paid to
employees located in Louisiana. SCo has property of $300 located in Louisiana
and property of that same amount located in Texas. It has payroll of $1,000 in
Louisiana and payroll of $2,000 in Texas. Under these facts, the combined group's
Louisiana property relating to the unitary business would be $1,200 ($900 + $300)
and the relevant worldwide property would be $1,500 ($900 + $300 +$300). The
property fraction, therefore, would be 0.8 ($1,200/$1,500). The combined group's
Louisiana payroll is $3,000 ($2,000 + $1,000) and its relevant worldwide payroll
is $5000 ($2,000 + $1,000 + $2,000). The combined payroll fraction is 0.6
($3,000/$5,000).
PCo has no relevant sales of widgets because its intra-group sales to SCo are
eliminated in the combined report. SCo has Louisiana sales of $3,000 (30 unit
sales x $100 unit price) and worldwide sales of $10,000 ($3,000 + (70 unit sales
x $100)). Thus the sales fraction is 0.3 ($3,000/$10,000). Under these facts, the
apportionment percentage, calculated under the double-weighted sales formula,'
would be fifty percent (1/4 x (0.8 + 0.6 + (2 x 0.3)). As a result, $1,500, or fifty
percent of the combined income of $3,000, would be apportioned to Louisiana.
Each member of a combined group would compute its separate tax liability by
applying steps four and five outlined above. Before those steps can be applied,
however, each member of the combined group must determine its share of the
combined group's Louisiana taxable income. The process of making that
calculation is referred to as intra-group apportionment. Our recommendations on
112. The example ignores the possibility that the State might include the value of inventoryin the
property factor. In principle, a formula that seeks to allocate half of the profits to the production states
and the other half to the market states should exclude inventory and assets related to the sale of
inventory from the property factor because inventory property relates to marketing profits and not to
production profits. Only "production assets" should be included in the formula. See McIntyre, Int'l
Treatise, supra note 25, at § 3/A.2.3.3. The Federal government included inventory and related assets
in its apportionment formula for over 70 years but finally got the correct theoretical answer in 1998.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(cXl)(i)(B) (as amended by T.D. 8786 (1998)).
113. In the UDITPA three-factor apportionment formula, the sum of the three fractions is
multiplied by 1/3. That sum is multiplied by 1/4 in the example because of the double weighting of
sales.
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how that apportionment should be accomplished are discussed in Part IV.A. 1,
below.
E. Water's Edge Rules
Even states that have not adopted a combined reporting regime often include
what the Federal government characterizes as foreign source income in the
pre-apportionment income of their corporate taxpayers. Under current law,
Louisiana does not provide an exclusion for foreign source income. Corporations
that participate in a unitary business similarly should be required to include in their
combined report their aggregate worldwide unitary income. Excluding income that
is classified as foreign source income under Federal tax concepts from the
combined report would be inconsistent with formulary apportionment, which
ignores federal concepts of source." 4 Including foreign source income in a
combined report is correct in theory and is constitutionally valid. In addition, it
should not present any serious practical difficulties in Louisiana.
In principle, a combined reporting regime should require foreign corporations
to be included in the combined unitary group if they are participating in the group's
unitary business. As discussed in Part II.A. above, the income of a unitary
enterprise should be taxed without regard to its organizational structure. Substance
should prevail over form. Form is elevated over substance when the income from
the foreign activities of a unitary business are excluded from the combined report
if they are conducted through a foreign corporation but are included in the
combined report if they are conducted through a foreign branch of a domestic
company. Obviously the operation of a unitary business is not confined by the
borders of the United States.
The Multistate Tax Commission has supported worldwide combined reporting
from its formation.' That method of taxation also has been supported by many
academics." 6 Two major United States Supreme Court cases have upheld its
constitutionality." 7 Its leading supporter among the states has been California.
Notwithstanding its many supporters, worldwide combined reporting has been
114. As long ago as 1924,the United States Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of foreign source
income in the pre-apportionment income of a corporation operating within theUnited States through
a branch. See Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82
(1924). See also Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 463 U.S. 159,103 S.
Ct. 2983 (1983), and Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298,114 S. Ct.
2268 (1994).
115. Pomp and Oldman, State & Local, supra note 13, at 10-36.
116. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating US.
International Taxation, 58 Tax Notes 1511 (Mar. 15, 1993); Richard Bird & Donald Brean, The
InterjurisdictionalAlocation of Income and the Unitary Taxation Debate, 34 Canadian Tax Journal
1377 (1986); Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49 Tax
Law Review 691 (1994); Michael J. McIntyre, Design of a NationalFormulary Apportionment Tax
System, 84th Conf. on Tax'n, Nat'l Tax Ass'n 118 (Frederick D. Stocker ed. 199 1); Pomp, Future of
State Taxation, supra note 41, at 63-64.
117. Container, 463 U.S. 159, 103 S. Ct. 2983; Barclays, 512 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct. 2268.
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under relentless attack from the multinational corporations and much of the
international tax community. During the Reagan Administration, the Treasury
Department joined the attack."'
In 1986, California adopted legislation that allowed a corporate group under
some conditions to avoid including certain foreign corporations in their combined
report." 9 The legislation is referred to as the water's edge election, and a combined
group making that election computes its income according to a water's edge
combined report. The water's edge election was liberalized in 1993.2 Subject to
certain restrictions, a unitary group making a water's edge election could eliminate
many foreign corporations from its combined report. Both the income and the
factors of those foreign corporations would not be taken into account in preparing
the combined report.
A water's edge election has no necessary effect on the treatment of the foreign
source income of domestic corporations that are included in the combined group.
In California, for example, the foreign source income of included corporations
remains includible in the unitary group's income.' Some other states that have
provided a water's edge election, however, have also limited their taxation of
foreign source income.' 2  We recommend against any such limitation.
States that had followed California's lead in adopting worldwide combined
reporting joined or preceded California in retreat from that position.' Without
engaging in a comprehensive review of all state tax codes, we note that Alaska,
California, Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Utah employ
worldwide combination,'"" and all of those States provide some form of water's
118. The Treasury Department convened a working group on formulary apportionment that
recommended that the states not include foreign corporations in their combined report. See The Final
Report of the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group: Chairman's Report and Supplemental
Views (1984) (reprinted in Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economic Perspectives on State Taxation of Multi-
jurisdictional Corporations 235 (1986)).
119. 1986 Cal. Stat. 660.
120. 1993 Cal. Stat. 881. For discussion ofthe 1993 legislation and the combination ofpressures
that led to its enactment, see Eric J. Coffill, A Kinder, Gentler 'Water's Edge' Election: California
Wards off Threats of UK Retaliation as Part of Comprehensive Business Incentive Tax Package, 61
Tax Notes 477 (Oct. 25, 1993) (also published in 7 Tax Notes Int'l 1049 (Oct. 25, 1993)). Jerome R.
Hellerstein, Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate Accounting With
Formulary Apportionment, 60 Tax Notes 1131, 1139 (Aug. 23, 1993) (referring to the water's edge
legislation as "a 'shotgun' maiage arrangement" because of the Federal and other pressures brought
to bear on California).
121. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25110(a)(2) and (3) (West Supp. 2001) (including domestic
corporations in the water's edge election without limitation as their income).
122. See. e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 43.1122(7) (1998) (exempting foreign dividends).
123. For example, the Colorado Legislature overrode the governor's veto to adopt a water's edge
election. 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 309. Florida, which had adopted worldwide combined reporting in
1983, abandoned it in 1984. 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-349; 1984Fla. Laws ch. 84-549. Oregon limited
its combined group to corporations filing federal consolidated returns, from which foreign corporations
are generally excluded. OR. VAB. 3029, 1984 Or. Spec. Sess. 1, ORS section 317.715.
124. Alaska Stat. § 43.20.072(Michie 2000); Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 25104-25137(West Supp.
2001); Idaho Code 63-3027B (Michie 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-31-301,15-31-305 (1999); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-A: 1,I (Supp. 2000);N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-14.3 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-
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edge election. 25 Many other states have adopted a combined reporting regime but
do not include foreign corporations in the combined unitary group. 2 6
Notwithstanding the merits of the case for mandatory worldwide combined
reporting, we do not recommend that Louisiana adopt it. In the current political
climate, the potential benefits simply are not worth the inevitable conflicts. We
also do not recommend a mandatory water's edge regime, due to our concerns
about potential constitutional challenges to it on Foreign Commerce Clause
grounds.127 Our recommended strategy is to adopt worldwide combined reporting
as the general rule and to allow taxpayers to make a water's edge election.
With some important exceptions, a unitary group making the water's edge
election would be permitted to omit the income and apportionment factors of
foreign affiliates from the combined report unless the foreign affiliates are engaged
in business in the United States under Federal tax concepts. ' All unitary domestic
corporations, however, would be included in the water's-edge combined report.
By permitting this election, Louisiana would avoid the need to audit the books of
many foreign affiliates and would reduce compliance costs for many multinational
corporations.)29
In general, we suggest that Louisiana follow California's lead in specifying the
details of the water's edge election. 3° Although we obviously do not recommend
403 (2000).
125. Alaska Stat. § 43.20.073 (Michie 2000); Cal. Rev. & Tax.Code 25110 (West Supp. 2001);
Idaho Code 63-3027(t) (Michie 2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 15-31-322 (1999); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
77-A:2-b (1991); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38.4-02 (2000); Utah Code 59-7-402 (2000).
126. States that generally require unitary business groups to file a combined report only for their
domestic members include Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, and Nebraska.
127. Under a purely domestic combination regime, a foreign incorporated enterprise would not
have the same right to combine its affiliates as would a domestic enterprise. A foreign corporation that
would have been better off under a combined report arguably would have a foreign commerce clause
complaint. We note, however, that state statutes limiting combined reports to U.S.corporations have
been upheld against foreign commerce clause attacks. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. C.I.R. of Minnesota, 568
N.W.2d 695 (Minn.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1112,118 S. Ct. 1043 (1998); Appeal of Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 864 P.2d 1175 (Kan. 1993); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 675 A.2d82
(Me. 1996).
128. Under Federal concepts, a foreign corporation is taxable on its business income that is
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. See I.R.C. § 871(b)(1). For discussion of the
Federal engaged-in-businessconcept, see McIntyre, Int'l Treatise, supra note 25, at § 2/B.3. California
requires that a unitary foreign corporation be included in the water's edge combined report to the extent
of its U.S. source business income. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 251 10(aX5) (West Supp. 2001); 18 Cal.
Code of Regs. § 2511 0(dX2)(GXiXI).
129. Taxpayers have asserted that California's worldwide combined reporting system imposed
unreasonable burdens on them. No doubt there are some special burdens,but the extent of those burdens
is unclear. In the Barclays Bank case, Barclays estimated, and the trial court found, that it would have
to pay $5 million to set up an appropriate accounting system and an additiona$2 million annually to
maintain that system. In contrast, the California Court of Appeal found that Barclays' actual annual
compliance costs ranged from $900 to $1,250. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of
California, 512 U.S. 298, 313-14, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2277-78 (1994).
130. California provides a useful summary of its water's edge rules, including copies of required
forms, in California Franchise Tax Board, "FTB ooW Booklet-2000 Water's-Edge Booklet (2000)
[hereinafter FTB Water's-Edge Booklet], available on-line at <http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/
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a slavish adoption of all of the California rules, we do recommend that Louisiana
use the various anti-abuse provisions built into the California water's edge rules as
a check list in fashioning its own system.
We also recommend that Louisiana adopt the California system of requiring
an electing water's edge group to sign an agreement consenting to taxation under
the water's edge regime. The California consent agreement is binding on current
members of the water's edge group and on any subsequent members that would
have qualified for inclusion in the group at the time of the agreement."' As part
of the agreement, the water's edge group obligates itself to provide the tax
department, on request, with extensive documentation of its activities, including
copies of relevant Federal tax forms."I
One important anti-abuse rule in the California system requires electing
taxpayers to make a binding election for an initial period of seven years."' Seven
years seems long enough to keep companies from moving into and out of the
system based on the relative profitability of their U.S. and foreign activities. 34 We
recommend, however, that Louisiana fine tune this election period by providing
that the election is automatically extended for an additional five years unless the
taxpayer gives notice of its intention not to renew before the beginning of the last
two years of its election period.' We also recommend that a control group, after
it has terminated a prior water's edge election, not be permitted to make a new
election until the end of a three-year waiting period. 3 6 The tax department should
have the authority to waive these restrictions in appropriate cases. The objective
of these election restrictions is to reduce the administrative burdens associated with
changes in the membership of a unitary group and to minimize tax planning
opportunities.
o0forms/00 IOWbk.pdf> (ast visited Mar. 11, 2001).
131. 18 Cal. Code ofRegs. § 2511 l-1(dX2) (1998).
132. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25112(b) (West Supp. 2001). The members of the water's-edge
combined group should also be required to provide the tax department with copies of any combined
report filed with any other state. North Dakota requires an electing group to provide a spreadsheet
showing its tax position in every state. N.D. Cent. Code 57-38.4-02.1 .d (2000).
133. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25111(a) (West Supp. 2001). As adopted in 1986, the election
period was ten years. 1986 Cal. Stat. 660. It was reduced to five years bya 1988 amendment. 1988
Cal. Stat. 989 and increased to seven years in 1993. The election period is five years under North
Dakota's water's edge regime. N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38.4-02.1.c (2000).
134. Idaho makes the water's edge election irrevocable, unless the intervening consent of the tax
administrator is obtained. Idaho Code § 63-3027C(a) (Michie 2000). Utah follows the same rule. Utah
Code § 59-7-402(2)(c) (2000). We do not favor this rule because we see some advantage in the tax
department making periodical reviews of an electing group's status and modifying, when appropriate,
certain terms of a water's edge renewal agreement.
135. California automatically renews an election for an additional year if the taxpayer has not
given notice of an intent to terminate within 90 days of the anniversary date. Cal.Rev. & Tax. Code
§ 25111 (a) and (d) (West. Supp. 2001).
136. The Federal rule on entity classification under the so-called check-the-boxregulations is that
a change in classification can only be made every five years. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(gXlXii). In the
California water's-edge system, the fact that a taxpayer has terminated its election does not affect its
ability to make a later election. 18 Cal. Code of Regs. § 25111-l(aX4) (1998).
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To control certain tax-avoidance strategies, Louisiana should follow the
California lead and require the inclusion of some unitary foreign affiliates in the
water's edge combined report. For example, Louisiana should require that a
foreign holding company be included in the water's edge group if it is being used
to park profits offshore that arose from the operation of the unitary group's
business. California achieves this result for U.S.-based unitary enterprises by
mandating that a controlled foreign corporation (CFC), as defined under Federal
tax-haven legislation, be included in the water's edge group to the extent of its tax-
haven income.' The Federal anti-haven rules, popularly referred to as the Subpart
F provisions, "' impose a current tax on various categories of passive income and
certain active business income deflected to a tax haven. 39 By piggy-backing on the
Federal legislation, Louisiana would block the most important types of foreign
holding company abuses by U.S.-based multinational companies without adding
substantially to their compliance burdens.
A different approach must be used to deal with foreign holding companies
controlled by foreign-based multinational companies and other foreign interests
because those holding companies are not subject to the Federal rules under Subpart
F. California has not developed a mechanism for dealing with that issue under its
water's edge regime. 1 Our recommendation is that Louisiana adopt an earnings-
stripping rule that would deny members of the water's edge group a deduction
against its pre-apportionment income for payments made to a foreign corporation
controlled by foreign interests if two conditions are met. First, the foreign
corporation receiving the payment must be part of a control group that includes
members of the water's edge combined group. Second, the income received by the
foreign corporation must be of a type that would be taxable by the Federal
government under the Subpart F provisions if received by a CFC.141 Because
denial of a deduction for a payment is economically equivalent to a tax on the
137. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 251 10(a)(7)(West Supp. 2001). The CFC includes in the water's
edge combined report its tainted income and the apportionment factors that relate to earning that
income.
138. I.R.C. §§ 951-964(2001). These sections are contained in subpart F of Part Ill of subchapter
N of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. The anti-avoidance rules applicable to certain foreign
funds, contained in I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297 (2001), are usually treated as part of the subpart F regime.
139. For a detailed discussion of Subpart F and related rules, see McIntyre, Int'l Treatise, supra
note 25, at ch. 7.
140. In Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994), California successfully imposed
worldwide combined reporting on a foreign corporation that had affiliates in many tax-haven countries,
including Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Isle
of Man, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Hebrides, Singapore, Turks and Caicos, and the Virgin
Islands. See Barclays International, A World of Banking-List of Offices (Nov. 1977). California's
water's edge regime generally would not reach income deflected to affiliates organized in such
countries.
141. The main category of income subject to the earnings-stripping rule would beincome of the
type classified as foreign personal holdingcompany income, as defined in I.R.C. § 954(cXl) (2001 ) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(aXI) (as amended in 1997). Absent special relief provisions, the Federal
governmenttypically would treat such income as periodical income subject to withholdingunder I.R.C.
§ 881 when received by a foreign corporation from U.S. sources.
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income out of which the payment was made, this anti-avoidance rule would result
in functionally equivalent treatment of foreign tax-haven companies whether they
are controlled by U.S. interests or by foreign interests. 4 2
The water's edge election should not allow foreign corporations having
substantial business activities in the United States to avoid being included in a
unitary group's combined report. California addresses this issue by requiring a
unitary corporation, whether domestic or foreign, to be included in the water's edge
combined group if twenty percent or more of its business activities, as measured
by its apportionment factors, is conducted within the United States. 43 Corporations
included in a water's edge combined report under this rule are popularly referred
to as "80-20 companies."'" Under the California system, foreign banks are not
included in the water's-edge election under the 80-20 rule. 45 Thus a foreign bank
is included in the water's edge combined report only to the extent of its U.S. source
business income and the related apportionment factors.'" Other states using the
80-20 rule do not have a special rule for foreign banks. 147 We endorse the 80-20
rule without the exception for banks.
A foreign corporation that is treated as a domestic corporation for purposes of
the Federal consolidated return rules should be treated as a domestic corporation
for purposes of determining the members of water's edge combined group. 4 In
addition, the income and related apportionment factors of a unitary foreign
corporation engaged in exporting goods from the United States should be included
in the water's edge combined group to the extent that the income qualifies for
favorable treatment under Federal tax laws. For example, a provision adopted by
the Federal government in 2000 provides an exemption for so-called
"extraterritorial income" that constitutes qualifying foreign trade income. 149 That
income should be included in the water's edge combined report. so
142. The Federal govermentdenies a deduction to foreign controlled domestic corporations with
respect to certain interest payments made to foreign related persons in order to prevent earnings
stripping. See I.R.C. § 1630) (2001).
143. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code section 251 10(aX3). Sales are not double weighted for purposes of
calculating the 20 percent figure. See FTB Water's Edge Booklet, supra note 130, at 8. Utah has a
similar rule except that only payroll and property are taken into account. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-7-
101 (26) and (33), 59-7-401(2Xa).
144. The term "80-20 company" probably was borrowed from the Federal tax lexicon. Under
I.R.C. § 861(aXIXA) (2001), interest paid by a domestic company is foreign source income if 80
percent or more of its gross income for a three-year testing period is active foreign business income.
A domestic corporation meeting the 80-percent active foreign business requirement is referred to as an
80-20 company. See McIntyre, Int'l Treatise, supra note 25, at 3/A. 1.
145. Id.
146. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 251 10(aX5) (West Supp. 2001).
147. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-7-101(33XaXi)(B).
148. See I.R.C. § 1504(d) (allowing certain Canadian and Mexican real property holding
companies to join a consolidated group). See, e.g., Idaho Code 63-3027B(a).
149. I.R.C.§I14(a)and(b)(2001). Foreign trade income is defined in I.R.C. §§ 941-943 (2001).
150. This export incentive replaces the foreign sales corporation (FSC) rules that were found to
be a prohibited exportsubsidy by the World Trade Organization. In 2001, a WTO dispute settlement
body held that the new incentive scheme was a prohibited export subsidy. The United States appealed
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The interaction of a state's rules on allocable income and a water's edge
election can lead to tax-avoidance opportunities. States employing a water's edge
election should not permit taxpayers to use that election to convert what otherwise
would be apportionable business income, subject to tax in a state, into allocable
income that is not taxable in the state.
To illustrate the potential for tax avoidance from characterizing business
income as nonbusiness allocable income, consider a unitary foreign affiliate that
is excluded from a Louisiana water's edge combined report. If the water's edge
election had not been made, the profits of the foreign affiliate would have been
included in the income of the unitary combined group and an apportioned share
would have been taxed by Louisiana. A subsequent dividend paid out of those
profits 'to another member of the combined group would have been washed out.
If the profits of the foreign affiliate are excluded from the water's edge combined
report, however, a subsequent dividend paid out of those profits should be taxable.
The proper result is reached by treating the subsequent dividend as apportionable
business income and not as allocable nonbusiness income.'
5
'
A similar problem arises when a member of the water's edge combined group
receives interest, royalties, and rents from a unitary foreign affiliate that is excluded
from that group by the water's edge election. The solution to the problem is also
similar. That is, the interest, royalties, or rents should be treated as unitary business
profits and not as allocable income.'52
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING A COMBINED REPORTING SYSTEM
If Louisiana decides to adopt a combined reporting system, the State should
consider several conceptual and practical matters addressed in this Part. Section
A discusses how a corporation having nexus with Louisiana that is a member of a
combined group would compute its individual tax in a combined reporting regime.
Section IV.A. 1. focuses on how the aggregate income of a combined group is
apportioned to individual members of the group. Section IV.A.2. deals with the
proper treatment of net operating losses and other corporate attributes that can be
attributed to some extent to combined reporting.
Section B addresses the issues that arise when members of a combined group
do not all have uniform accounting periods. Section IV.B. 1. offers guidance on
that decision to the WTO Appellate Body and lost. Under California's water's-edge regime, FSCs are
included in the water's edge combined group. See Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 251 10(aX) (West Supp.
2001).
151. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25110(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 200 1) (treating certain dividends
received by a water's edge combined group as business profits). Louisiana currently treats certain
categories of income as allocable income without reference to the relationship of those income items
to the taxpayer's unitary business. This aspect of Louisiana's allocation rules may present constitutional
problems that need to be addressed whether or not Louisiana adopts a combined reporting regime.
152. The proposed rule is similar in function to the look-through rules used by the Federal
governmentin characterizing dividends, interest, rents, and royalties as general business income under
the separate basket rules of I.R.C. § 904(d) (2001).
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determining the annual accounting period for the group. Section IV.B.2. examines
the problem of determining the combined income of a unitary group when some
members employ different accounting periods from each other. Section IV.B.3.
explains how to determine the combined income of individual members of that
group when accounting periods of members are not uniform. Section IV.B.4.
explores the problem of selecting the statutory starting date for the adopting of a
combined reporting regime.
Section C recommends approaches for handling intra-group transactions. In
general, intra-group transactions should have no tax consequences-that is, they
should result in a wash. This so-called wash rule is developed in Section IV.C. 1.
Section IV.C.2. sets forth rules for adjusting the basis in the stock of members of
the combined group to account for intra-group transactions. Section IV.C.3.
considers transitional issues that arise when transactions initiated under a separate
reporting rule are consummated after a state adopts a combined reporting regime.
A. Taxation of the Individual Members of a Unitary Group
The combined report prepared by a unitary group is not itself a tax return.'
Tax returns based upon the income of the unitary group are typically filed by the
group's individual members.' 5" Section IV.A. 1., below, addresses issues that arise
in imposing tax liability on individual members of a unitary group with respect to
unitary income. Section IV.A.2. addresses issues relating to the assignment within
a unitary group of certain corporate attributes, such as net operating losses, which
appear on the individual books of an individual member of that group.
1. Determining the Taxable Income of Individual Members of a Unitary
Group
The apportionment formula that a unitary group employs in preparing its
Louisiana combined report determines the amount of unitary income attributable
to, and properly taxable by, Louisiana. To collect tax on that income, however,
Louisiana must assess one or more corporations that are members of the unitary
group and engaged in business in the State. One approach would be to designate
one member of the unitary group as a principal member and impose tax on that
member.' Although this approach is workable,'" we do not recommend it for
Louisiana, largely because it would represent an unnecessary departure from the
153. For discussion, see supra Part III.A.
154. Under some circumstances, a state may permit the unitary group to file a consolidated tax
return. For a description of the California election rule, see Cal. FTB Pub. 1061 (1999) at 4, available
at <www.ftb.ca.gov/forrms/misc/index.htm> (last visited Feb. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Cal. FTP Pub.
1061].
155. It is useful to designate one member of a unitary group as the principal member for the
purpose of determining the annual accounting period to be used by the unitary group in preparing its
combined report. See infra Section IV.B. I.
156. Some may also object to this approachon esthetic grounds for it is not entirely consistent with
the theory of the unitary business principle.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
practices of other states using combined reporting without any significant policy
gain.
Our preferred approach is to use a pro rata intra-state apportionment formula
to attribute the share of the income of the unitary group among the Louisiana-
taxable members of the group that have contributed to the generation of that
income. Under the intra-state apportionment formula, the income assigned to each
taxable member would be the income of the combined group apportioned to
Louisiana multiplied by a fraction. The numerator of that fraction would be the
Louisiana apportionment percentage of the individual group member, and the
denominator would be the aggregate Louisiana apportionment percentage for the
unitary group.
To illustrate the operation of the intra-state apportionment formula, assume
that XCo, YCo, and ZCo constitute a unitary group and that the group earns
income from its unitary business of $1,000. The Louisiana apportionment
percentage for the group, computed under the formula discussed in Part II!.D.,
above, is assumed to be 40% (0.4). If the apportionment formula is applied only
to XCo (i.e., the formula is applied using only XCo's Louisiana factors), XCo's
Louisiana apportionment percentage would be 30% (0.3). If the formula is applied
only to the Louisiana factors of YCo, YCo's apportionment percentage would be
10% (0.1). ZCo has no Louisiana factors, so its percentage would be zero.
Under these facts, $400 of the group's unitary income would be apportioned
to Louisiana (40% x $1,000). Of that amount, $300 ($400 x 0.3/0.4) would be
taxable to XCo and $100 ($400 x 0.1/0.4) would be taxable to YCo. None of the
unitary business income of the combined group would be taxable to ZCo ($400 x
0.0/0.4). Indeed, under these facts, it is unlikely that ZCo would have any
reporting obligation to Louisiana, a State with which ZCo is unlikely to have any
nexus.
In practice, the above formula can be simplified. The Louisiana taxable
income of a unitary group (A) equals the total taxable income of the group as
shown on the combined report (B) multiplied by the Louisiana apportionment
percentage shown on the combined report (C). That is, A = B x C. The Louisiana
taxable income of a group member (D) equals A multiplied by the Louisiana
apportionment percentage of that group member (E) divided by C. That is, D = A
x E/C. Simple algebra shows that D = (B x C) x E/C = B x E. That is, the taxable
income of a group member equals the total taxable income of the unitary group
multiplied by the group member's Louisiana apportionment percentage. 
57
Although we favor the use of the intra-state apportionment formula described
above, we do not believe that a unitary group should be allowed to use the formula
to reduce tax that is apportioned to Louisiana on the combined report. For
example, we do not believe that the insolvency of one group member should reduce
the tax due to Louisiana on income apportioned to Louisiana. To prevent a loss of
revenue when income is attributed to an insolvent corporation under the intra-state
157. For an application of this simplified formula, see California Schedule R (Apportionment and
Allocation oflncome) (2000), available at <http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/oformLs/00_100R.pdf> (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001).
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apportionment formula, we recommend that all "Louisiana-taxable" members of
a unitary group be jointly and severally liable (solidary liability in Louisiana) for
the full amount of the tax assessed with respect to unitary income apportioned
to Louisiana on the combined report."' s
Assume, for example, that XCo in the above example is insolvent. In that
event, Louisiana should be permitted to collect the share of income tax attributed
to XCo from YCo. The XYZ corporate group should not be able to avoid
Louisiana tax on the Louisiana income it has earned simply because one member
of the joint enterprise is insolvent. This joint and several liability rule is
particularly important when the unitary group has deprived one of its members
of the resources necessary to pay its tax obligations.
2. Treatment of Corporate Attributes
Section IV.A.2.a., below discusses whether certain corporate attributes, such
as net operating losses, should be available to members of a unitary group other
than the member to which they were initially assigned under the tax laws.
Section IV.A.2.b. discusses the proper transitional rule to apply to certain
corporate attributes that arose, at least in part, under the prior separate reporting
regime.
a. Ongoing Treatment of Corporate Attributes
Corporate attributes, by definition, are assigned under the tax law to a
particular corporation. In designing a combined reporting regime, a state should
consider whether the corporate attributes assigned to one member of a unitary
group could be used by other members of the corporate group. In our view, the
proper treatment of corporate attributes depends on the circumstances under
which they initially arose.
In general, we recommend that a combined reporting regime permit
members of a corporate group to obtain the benefits of another member's
corporate attribute if that attribute arose from activities that are treated as group
activities under the combined reporting regime. If the tax attribute arose from
what are treated as the separate activities of the group member, we recommend
that the benefits of that attribute be limited to the member to which it was
initially assigned. We discuss the application of this approach in the context of
two important corporate attributes: net operating losses (NOLs) and excess
investment tax credits.
158. In this respect, we propose that Louisiana follow the Federal consolidated return rule, which
makes each member of the consolidated group severally liable for the tax on the consolidated income
of the group. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6(a) (1966). Our recommendation on joint and several liability is
based on practical realities and is not grounded on the unitary business principle. The fact that
consolidated reporting is consensual and combined reporting is mandatory does not dissuadeis from
recommending this useful rule.
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i. Net Operating Losses (NOLs)
NOLs may arise from the combined activities of a unitary group or from the
separate activities of a group member unrelated to the unitary business. In the
first case, the NOL should be available to other members of the group if the
member to which it was initially assigned is unable to use it. We suggest it be
assigned to other members in proportion to their share of the group's unitary
income in the year of assignment. The purpose of this pro rata rule is to provide
certainty to taxpayers and to prevent possible abuses. 5 9
For example, assume that PCo and SCo make up a unitary group. In year
one, the group suffers an apportioned loss of $100, with $50 of the loss assigned
to PCo and the remaining $50 assigned to SCo. 16 In year two, the unitary group
enjoys an apportioned gain of $200. Because of changes in the apportionment
percentages, only $30 of that gain is assigned to SCo. SCo would use $30 of the
NOL to reduce its income to zero. Under our recommended rule, PCo would be
permitted to utilize SCo's excess NOL of $20 to reduce its own income. 61 If
SCo's excess NOL had arisen from losses incurred in a nonunitary business,
however, PCo would not be permitted to use the NOL under our proposed rule.
ii. Investment Tax Credit
A corporation becomes eligible for an investment tax credit when it makes
certain investments favored by the taxing state. In principle, an investment made
by a member of a unitary group that qualifies for a tax credit may be viewed in
one of two ways: as a subsidy to the unitary business, or as a subsidy to the
individual member making the tax-favored investment. If viewed as the former,
the credit should be available to other members of the group if the member to
which it was initially assigned is unable to use it. As explained below, we
believe the investment credit is best understood as a subsidy to the corporation
making the investment. We conclude, therefore, that excess tax credits should
remain with the member of the group that made the qualifying investment and
should not be available to reduce the taxable income of any other members of the
corporate group in the absence of specific statutory language to the contrary.
159. Many issues arise in determining the proper treatment ofNOLs that are outside the scope of
this Article. We focus here on general principles and not on the myriad of issues that arise in applying
those principles.
160. In a combined report, losses, like income,are apportioned under the applicable apportionment
formula.
161. This example assumes that NOLs should be assigned to members of a combined group using
the current apportionment factors rather than the factors that existed when the losses were incurred. If
the change from the historical factors to the current factors is sufficiently large, it may be appropriate
to use the historical factors for assigning losses in order to reflect fairly the extent of the taxpayer's
business activities in the taxing state. A tax department should have the authority to achieve equitable
apportionment in such circumstances. See UDITPA, supra note 4, at § 18 (allowing adjustments if the
apportionment rule otherwise applied does not "fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business
activity in the state"); La. R.S. 47:287.94(C) (2001) (permitting separate accounting in certain
circumstances to prevent a "manifestly unfair result").
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One might imagine that a state actually intended to grant an investment tax
credit to a unitary business as a whole rather than to the individual members of that
unitary business. In that event, the entitlement to the credit would be assigned
initially among members of a unitary group in accordance with the interstate and
intra-state apportionment formulas. 62 We believe, however, that such an intent is
implausible and should not be inferred unless the legislature has stated such an
intent clearly. In our experience, state tax incentives are always intended to
promote investment within the state and are not intended to promote investment
generally without reference to its location."
In addition, members of a multistate unitary enterprise generally should not
want to interpret a state statute granting a tax credit to individual companies as
intended for the unitary group. If that interpretation prevails, then some of the
credit allowable to individual companies under the statute should be apportioned
to income taxes owed to other states. The result would be that only the credit
apportioned to taxes paid to the state granting the credit should be allowable in
reducing taxes owned to that state. From the perspective of the multistate
enterprise, the credit apportioned to taxes imposed by other states would be wasted.
Assume, for example, that XCo, YCo, and ZCo constitute a unitary group, that
XCo and YCo have all their property and payroll in Louisiana but make sales
outside the State, and that ZCo has no property, payroll, or sales in Louisiana. The
Louisiana apportionment percentage for the group is seventy percent; XCo has a
Louisiana apportionment percentage of fifty percent, YCo has a Louisiana
apportionment percentage of twenty percent, and ZCo has a Louisiana
apportionment percentage of zero. XCo makes an investment that qualified for an
investment tax credit of $1,000. If that investment is considered to be an
investment of the unitary group, then XCo should be allowed an initial credit of
$500 ($1,000 x 70% x (50%-70%) against its Louisiana tax and YCo should be
allowed an initial credit of $200 ($1,000 x 70% x (20%-70%) against its Louisiana
tax. The remaining credit of $300 would be apportioned to ZCo.
From the perspective of the unitary group, the portion of the credit attributed
to ZCo would be wasted because ZCo owes no Louisiana income taxes. The
tradeoff for this loss of credit would be that any credit that XCo could not use
would be available to YCo, and vice versa. For multistate enterprises, we strongly
suspect that this advantage will not offset the loss of the credit apportioned outside
of Louisiana.
In the interest of completeness, we note that one might imagine that a state
legislature intended to grant the full investment tax credit, on a pro rata basis, only
to the members of the unitary group having a tax liability in the state. Under that
162. A comparable result is achieved under the Federal consolidated return rules through a
consolidated tax credit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3 (as amended in 2000).
163. We do not address in this Article whether this familiar locational bias presents potential
discrimination under the Commerce Clause. For discussion of that issue, see Peter D. Enrich, Saving
the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraintson State Tax Incentives for Business, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 377 (1996) [hereinafter Enrich, Saving the States]; Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen,
Commerce Clause Restraints on StateBusiness DevelopmentIncentives, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789 (1996).
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scenario, a unitary group would be able to use all of the credit to offset taxes
imposed by the state. The legislative intent supporting this scenario, however,
cannot be inferred from the legislature's adoption of the unitary business principle
-indeed, it obviously would reflect a major departure from that principle. Such
a legislative intent should only be "discovered" in the presence of clear evidence
of its existence.
b. Transition Rules for Corporate Attributes Carried Over from
Separate Reporting Regime
There are two main issues to address in designing transition rules applicable
to corporate attributes. The first is the proper treatment under a combined reporting
regime of corporate attributes that arose under the separate reporting regime. For
example, how should a net operating loss (NOL) that arose in year one, a separate
reporting year, be treated in year two, a combined reporting year? The second
issue is the proper treatment of corporate attributes that have some link to a
separate reporting year but did not fully mature until the combined reporting
regime was in place. An example would be a sale arranged, but not closed, in year
one (separate reporting year) and a recognition of the income from that sale in year
two (a combined reporting year).
The appropriate rule for corporate attributes falling within the first category
is that they should be treated as belonging to the entity that established them and
should not be available to the combined group. Our rationale is that the corporate
attribute, at the time it was created, was considered by the state and the taxpayer
as an attribute of the corporation that established it. Our proposed transition rule
would protect the reasonable expectations of the state and the taxpayer. Granting
the corporate attribute to the unitary business is not required under any principle
of fairness and would not result in any efficiency gain.'"
Proper treatment of the second category of corporate attributes is harder to
determine in the abstract. To promote simplicity, we recommend that corporate
attributes that mature under the combined reporting regime be treated as if they had
arisen entirely within that regime. For example, a sale contracted but not closed in
a separate reporting year and closed in a combined reporting year should be treated
as apportionable income includible in the combined report. Similarly, a loss that
was recognized from the sale of property during the combined reporting regime
should be included in the combined report even if the loss is attributable to a
decline in value accruing during the separate reporting regime.
We recognize, nevertheless, that our proposed rule might produce an
unreasonable result in some special cases. Assume, for example, that SCo, a
corporation that has no nexus with State A, has made all the arrangements for a sale
of a substantial portion of its assets. A few days before the sale is completed, State
164. For a brief analysis of fairness issues arising in the design of tax transition rules, see Michael
J. McIntyre, Transition Rules: Learning to Live with Tax Reform, 4 Tax Notes 7 (Aug. 30, 1976). For
a more detailed treatment, see Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 (1977).
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A adopts a combined reporting regime. Under the new regime, SCo and TCo form
a unitary combined group. Assume also that TCo has most of its apportionment
factors in State A and those factors are substantially larger than SCo's factors,
which are not located in State A. Under these facts, a substantial portion of the
income derived by SCo on the sale of its assets would be apportioned to State A.
In such circumstances, the tax department of State A should be given the flexibility
to fashion a relief measure that achieves substantial fairness.
165
The tax department also should have the authority to prevent taxpayers from
obtaining an unfair benefit from the transition to the new system. To prevent unfair
results, it should have the discretionary authority to impose an equitable settlement
on the taxpayer, similar to the discretionary authority to adjust inappropriate results
that is reserved to the tax department under section 18 of UDITPA.
As an illustration of the need for such discretionary authority, assume that PCo
has entered into an installment agreement that requires a payment of $10 million
to be made to XCo, an unrelated person, at the end of year one. PCo is taxable in
State L on all of its income-that is, all of PCo's apportionment factors are located
in State L. If XCo makes the payment to PCo as agreed, PCo will be taxable in
State L on all of the income derived from the installment sale. Assume, however,
that PCo and XCo, for legitimate business reasons, change the agreement so that
XCo makes the payment to PCo at the start of year two. Assume also that State L
adopts a combined reporting regime beginning in year two. PCo is engaged in a
unitary business with QCo. All of QCo's apportionment factors are located outside
of State L, and those factors are large relative to PCo's factors. As a result, most
of the income derived from the installment sale would be apportioned to states
other than State L unless the tax department has the authority to adjust that result
to achieve fairness.
B. Issues Arising When Members of a Unitary Group Do Not All Use the Same
Accounting Period
Corporations that are members of the same unitary group may not all have the
same annual accounting period. For example, one member of a unitary group may
compute its income for financial accounting purposes and Federal income tax
purposes using the calendar year, whereas another member of the same unitary
group may use a fiscal year that does not start on January I and end on December
3 1. The lack of accounting-period uniformity within a unitary group presents three
issues that a state adopting combined reporting must address.
As an initial matter, a state must specify the accounting period to be used by
the unitary group in these circumstances. That issue is addressed in Section
IV.B. I., below. In addition, a state must develop rules for determining the
165. A case with somewhat analogous facts is Firstar Corp. v. Comm 'r of Revenue, 575 N.W.2d
835 (Minn. 1998). In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted relief to the taxpayer-a result
we approve, at least in principle. Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an attempt to avoid
a constitutional question, improperly interpreted the Minnesota apportionment statute. TheFirstar
problem can be avoided by giving the tax department the discretion proposed in the text.
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combined income of the unitary group for its accounting period when some
members of that group are using a different annual accounting period. That issue
is addressed in Section IV.B.2., below. A related issue, addressed in Section
IV.B.3., arises when the combined income of a unitary group for its accounting
period must be assigned to the overlapping accounting periods of nonconforming
members of the unitary group.
Section IV.B.4. addresses issues that arise in setting the initial starting date of
the combined reporting regime when a separate-reporting state, such as Louisiana,
introduces combined reporting. If all members ofunitary groups used the calendar
year as their annual accounting period, the new regime could begin on January 1
of the first year following its adoption. The choice of a starting state is more
complex, however, when some members taxable under the new regime have
adopted a fiscal year as their annual accounting period.
1. Determining the Annual Accounting Period for a Unitary Group
Income for tax purposes is measured over some accounting period. In general,
the accounting period for a corporate taxpayer is a either a calendar year or a
twelve-month fiscal year, although a short fiscal year may be used at the start or
end of a taxpayer's corporate existence. A unitary group that files a combined
report must adopt an annual accounting period for the purpose of computing the
income included in the combined report. If all the members of the unitary group
compute their separate incomes according to the same accounting period, then the
choice of an accounting period for the unitary group is obvious. The choice is less.
obvious, however, when the accounting periods of the members are not uniform.
The Federal government addresses a similar issue under its consolidated return
rules.'" It has resolved the issue in large part by requiring all members of a
corporate group filing a consolidated tax return to adopt the same taxable year.
16 7
The Federal solution greatly reduces the scope of a state's problem because
corporations generally use the same annual accounting period for state purposes as
they use for Federal purposes. The state problem remains, however, whenever the
Federal consolidated group is not coterminous with the state combined group.'68
In addition, the problem arises for both the Federal government and the states for
the transitional year in which members of a corporate group are adopting a uniform
annual accounting period.
The California approach, which we endorse with some modifications, is to
require a unitary group to use the annual accounting period of its "principal
member."'69 If the unitary group has a hierarchal structure, with a parent
166. See .R.C. § 1501 etseq.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-76(a)(1) (as amended in 2000) ("[t]he consolidated return of a group
must be filed on the basis of the common parent's taxable year ... ").
168. The Federal consolidated group is based on stock ownership; no federal concept of a unitary
business exists. Corporations not eligible to be included in a consolidated return may be members of
the combined group.
169. Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5(b)(12). For a detailed explanation of the California rule, see FTB
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corporation at the top of the hierarchy and subsidiaries and lower-tier corporations
under it, the parent corporation would be the principal member. 7 ' This rule is easy
to apply and promotes uniformity among the states.
If the unitary group does not include a common parent corporation for all
members of the group, the selection of the appropriate accounting period for the
unitary group is more complex. We suggest as a default rule that the unitary group,
for the purpose of adopting its initial accounting period, designate as its principal
member the member having the largest aggregate amount of property, defined in
accordance with the rules for identifying property in the apportionment formula.
The accounting period of the principal member in that year would become the
accounting period for the unitary group. We recommend that the accounting
period of the group, as determined under this rule, remain unchanged regardless of
how the composition of the group may evolve in subsequent years. Thus we
counsel against a change in the unitary group's accounting period even if the
"principal member" leaves the combined group in some future year or is no longer
the member with the most property.
Under our proposed rule, each member of the combined group must determine
the aggregate amount of its property. For purposes of simplicity and uniformity,
we recommend that "property" for this limited purpose be property of the type
included in the denominator of the property ratio used in Louisiana's
apportionment formula.' For example, intangible property not included in the
formula would not be taken into account for this purpose as well. To conform to
the treatment of the property factor in the many states that follow UDITPA, we
recommend that the original cost of an item of property be used to set the "value"
of the property for this limited purpose. 7 2 The Louisiana rule is to include property
in the apportionment formula at original cost minus a reserve for depreciation.'
Although we are not suggesting here that Louisiana modify its current rule for
purposes of apportionment, we do recommend that it abandon it for the limited
purpose of determining the principal member of a unitary group in order to
promote uniformity among the states.
Under California law, the accounting period for a unitary group not having a
parent member is the accounting period of the member having the largest amount
of property in that State (as determined under the rules for computing the
numerator of the property ratio in the apportionment formula). 74 The weakness of
this approach is that if all states adopted a comparable rule, the accounting period
of a unitary group might not be the same in all of the states where the unitary group
conducts its unitary business. Our proposed rule, in contrast, promotes uniformity
and, as a result, computational simplicity.
Pub. 1061, supra note 154, at 5.
170. Id. The Federal approach is similar. See Treas. Reg. § 1502-76(aXl)(as amended in 2000)
("each subsidiary must adopt the common parent's annual accounting period for the first consolidated
return year for which the subsidiary's income is includible in the consolidated return").
171. See supra Part III.D.
172. See UDITPA, supra note 4, at § 11.
173. La. R.S. 47:287.95(G) (2001).
174. FTB Pub. 1061,supra note 154, at 5.
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The operation of our proposed rule for unitary groups that do not have a
parent corporation as a member is illustrated by the following example.
Assume that ACo, BCo, and CCo are brother-sister companies. ACo has
aggregate property of $50, determined under the rules that apply in
determining its aggregate property in the apportionment formula of UDITPA.
BCo and CCo have aggregate property, respectively, of $60 and $70. Under
these facts, CCo would be the principal member of the combined group for the
group's initial taxable year. Its accounting period would become the
accounting period for the combined group, and that accounting period would
not change in future years even if CCo no longer held the most property or if
CCo left the combined group.
Our proposed rules for determining the accounting period of a combined
group are relatively easy to apply and are designed to promote uniformity
among states using the combined reporting method. As a further contribution
to uniformity, we recommend that Louisiana allow a unitary group to elect its
principal member when it files its first combined report if it has already
selected a principal member in another state.' The purpose of the election is
to allow a unitary group to reduce its accounting burdens by using the same
annual accounting period in Louisiana that it is using in other states in which
it is filing a combined report.
Regardless of the method used to select the initial annual accounting
period, a unitary group should not be permitted to change its accounting period
after its first filing period without the consent of the tax department. The tax
department, moreover, should have the authority to require a unitary group to
change its accounting period if such a change is necessary to reflect clearly the
income of the unitary group. The department also should have the authority
to require members of a unitary group to adopt the accounting period of its
principal member if the unitary group is exploiting the lack of accounting-
period uniformity within the group to distort its income.
We do not believe that a state should follow the Federal lead and require
all members of a unitary group to adopt the same annual accounting period.
The Federal consolidated return rules are voluntary. As a result, a corporate
group that has strong business reasons for not adopting a uniform annual
accounting period for its constituent members can achieve its business goals
by declining to file a consolidated return. A combined report, however, must
be mandatory to work effectively. As a result, a state should design its
combined reporting rules to accommodate the business needs of its taxpayers.
As discussed in Section IV.B.2. below, a state can encourage a unitary group
to adopt a uniform annual accounting period by removing the tax benefits
associated with having multiple annual accounting periods within a corporate
group.
175. California allows a more comprehensive election. See Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5(bX(2)(B)
(allowing a combined group to electits principal member in the initial year of a combined report "so
long as consistently treated as such for the year of the election and thereinafter").
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2. Determining Combined Income When Members Employ Different
Accounting Periods
The combined income of a unitary group for an accounting period is simply
the sum of the unitary income of each member of the unitary group for that
accounting period. When the annual accounting period used by a member of a
unitary group differs from the accounting period used in preparing the combined
report, however, some method must be adopted for determining the income of that
group member that relates to the accounting period employed in making the
combined report. The following example illustrates the issue.
Assume that PCo, a parent corporation, and SCo, its wholly-owned subsidiary,
are engaged in the operation of a unitary business in Louisiana. PCo uses the
calendar year as its annual accounting period. SCo uses a fiscalyear that starts on
July I and ends on June 30. The unitary group uses the calendar year in preparing
its combined report because that is the accounting period of PCo, its principal
member. For calendar year 2002, PCo has unitary income of $30. For its fiscal
year 2001/2002, SCo has unitary income of $12. It has unitary income of $24 for
fiscal year 2002/2003. In determining the unitary group's combined income for
calendar year 2002, it is necessary to determine the portions of SCo's income for
fiscal years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 that relates to calendar year 2002.
There are at least two possible ways to resolve the issue illustrated above. One
way would be to require the nonconforming members of a unitary group to
determine their income for purposes of the combined report by reconstructing their
books of account. In the above example, SCo would determine its unitary income
for calendar year 2002 by determining the income it would have earned in that year
had it adopted a calendar year as its annual accounting period. We reject this
approach as unnecessarily burdensome on taxpayers and subject to potential
abuse. 7 6 The alternative way to resolve the issue set forth above is to use a formula
to determine the income of a nonconforming member that relates to the annual
accounting period of the principal member of its unitary group. Under the formula,
a portion of the income from the nonconforming member's two overlapping years
would be assigned to the taxable period used to compute the combined report. We
recommend a formula that treats income from the two overlapping periods as
earned uniformly throughout each year. This pro rata formula would determine the
amount of income of a nonconforming member that would be included in the
combined report for an annual accounting period as follows:
Y, = (Y, x ml,--12) + (Y2 x m2+12), where
Y, is the income of the nonconforming member included in the combined
report;
176. We are assuming that nonconforming members cannot adopt the accounting period used by
the principal member without excessive difficulty. If that assumption is not valid, we would expect
nonconformingmembers to adopt the accountingperiod of the principal member of their unitary group.
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Yj is the income of the nonconforming member for its first overlap year;
Y2 is the income of the nonconforming member for its second overlap
year;
m, is the number of months of the first overlap year that fall within the
accounting period used in preparing the combined report; and
m2 is the number of months of the second overlap year that fall within the
accounting period used in preparing the combined report.
If the above formula is applied to the facts of the example above, then SCo
would include $6 of its income in the combined report for fiscal year 2001/2002
($12 x 6/12) and $12 ($24 x 6/12) for fiscal year 2002/2003, for a total inclusion
in the combined report of $18. PCo would include its entire unitary income of $30
for calendar year 2002, bringing the total income of the unitary group included in
the combined report to $48 ($18 + $30).
We recommend a similar approach be followed with respect to the factors of
the nonconforming member. The property factor will be a pro rata portion of the
non-conforming member's property numerator and denominator values for its
respective separate accounting periods, reflecting the beginning and ending average
property values for those separate accounting periods. For example, using the
example above, SCo would first calculate its property factor for fiscal year
2001/2002. Half of that amount would enter into the group's property factor when
calculating the group's apportionment formula for calendar year 2002. SCo also
would calculate its property factor for fiscal year 2002/2003 and half of that
amount would enter into the group's property factor when calculating the group's
apportionment formula for calendar year 2002. SCo would follow a comparable
approach with respect to its payroll and sales factors.
As this discussion indicates, a member of a unitary group with a
nonconforming annual accounting period must compute its income and factors for
both of the accounting periods that overlap the accounting period used in preparing
the combined report. As a practical matter, the member may not have complete
information about its income and factors for the second overlapping period when
the combined report is being prepared. I" For example, SCo in the example above
may not know its income for fiscal year 2002/2003 at the time the combined report
for fiscal year 2002 is being prepared. To avoid delays in the completion of the
combined report, members with nonconforming accounting periods should be
required to make their best estimate of their income for their second overlapping
period.' " They would file an amended return to reflect actual income figures for
that period when those figures become available if the actual income and
apportionment data result in a material change in the tax liabilities of the members
177. Extensions of time to file the combined report may lessen the magnitude of having to prepare
a combined report before all data from non-conforming members are available.
178. This is the California rule. See Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5-4(cX4).
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of the group. If the change in income from the estimate is not material, it would
be reflected in the tax return filed for the next accounting period.
We anticipate that most unitary groups would find the pro rata formula
convenient to use. To avoid potential hardship, however, we suggest that
nonconforming members be permitted to elect to determine the amounts to be
included in the combined report by reconstructing their books of account to reflect
the taxable year of their principal member. 79 This election to use a reconstruction
method should be binding for all future years unless the nonconforming member
receives the consent of the tax authorities to change the election. In addition, the
tax authorities should be permitted to require the nonconforming member to use the
pro rata formula if the member fails to provide information adequate to justify its
reconstructed books of account. Further, the tax department should be authorized
to require a combined group that makes a change its accounting period for any
reason to make adjustments in its income so as to ensure that the change does not
result in a material distortion or omission of income.
3. Attributing the Combined Income of a Unitary Group to Members of the
Unitary Group When Accounting Periods of Group Members Are Not Uniform
As discussed in Section IV.A. I., above, the combined report is not a tax return.
The income computed on the combined report is apportioned among the members
of the unitary group using an intra-state apportionment formula. Adjustments must
be made in the application of the intra-state formula when the members of a unitary
group do not have a uniform annual accounting period. These adjustments are
similar in concept to the adjustments described in Section IV.B.2., above.
A member of a unitary group with a nonconforming annual accounting period
should include in its income an amount from each of the combined group's annual
accounting periods that overlaps its own accounting period. In general, the amount
would be determined by application of a pro rata formula, similar to the formula
described in Section IV.B.2., above.
Assume, for example, that PCo and SCo form a unitary group. PCo is the
principal member of the group. Its annual accounting period, and the annual
accounting period used to prepared the combined report, is the calendar year. SCo
uses a fiscal year ending June 30 as its annual accounting period. For its fiscal year
2002/2003, SCo is taxable on one-half of its apportioned share of the combined
group's income for calendar year 2002 and one-half for calendar year 2003. If
SCo's apportioned share of the combined income for 2002 is $3,000 and for 2003
is $4,000, it should include $3,500 ( / x $3,000 + 1/ x $4,000) in income for its
fiscal year 2002/2003. The portion of the combined income for 2003 that SCo did
not include in income for its fiscal year 2002/2003 would be included in income
for fiscal year 2003/2004.
As a practical matter, a member of a unitary group with a nonconforming
annual accounting period will not know the income that will be reported on the
179. See Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5-4(b).
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combined report for the second overlapping accounting period when it files its tax
return. For example, SCo in the above example would not know the unitary
group's combined income for calendar year 2003 when it files its own tax return
for fiscal year 2002/2003. In such circumstances, the nonconforming member
should make a good faith estimate of the unitary group's combined income for the
second overlap year. It should be required to file an amended return if the
estimated amounts depart in a material way from the actual income amounts.
Otherwise, it should reconcile the estimate and the actual income when it files its
next tax return.
4. Selecting the Starting Date for Combined Reporting
To designate a single date, like January 1, 2002, as the effective date for the
adoption of a combined reporting regime unnecessarily creates tax accounting
problems for a unitary group that is not using the calendar year as the accounting
period for itself and all of its members. To reduce those problems, the date for
filing the first combined report generally should be the first day of the taxable year
of the principal member of the unitary group that begins after December 31 of a
specified year. For example, if the taxable year of the principal member of a
unitary group runs from July I to June 30 and the state adopts a combined reporting
rule for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2002, then that unitary group
would begin filing a combined report for its fiscal year beginning on July 1,2003.
This approach permits members of a unitary group having a common annual
accounting period to begin their first taxable year under the new regime without
having to include in that taxable year any income realized and recognized for a
reporting period governed by the old regime. The accounting simplicity from
starting the new system at the start of the group's taxable year is obvious. We
believe that a substantial majority of unitary groups would be able to take
advantage of this accommodation.
Benefits from this approach also accrue to the principal member of a unitary
group that does not have a uniform annual accounting period. For the principal
member, the proposed starting date would fall at the start of its annual accounting
period, thereby reducing the accounting burdens on it. "o We do not see how one
can avoid some inconvenience, however, to the members of the unitary group that
do not have the same accounting period as the principal member. Members of the
group with a different accounting period are likely to confront some significant
accounting problems because they will have to file a separate report for a portion
of the first year of operation of the new regime and a combined report for the
remaining portion of that year. The obvious solution to those problems is for these
180. We proposed in Section IV.B.l. that the tax department be granted the right to impose a
particular accounting period on a combined group when necessary to reflect clearly the income of the
combined group. The department might find it necessary to invoke this power if a combined group
selects an inappropriate principal member simply to forestall application of the combined reporting
regime.
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taxpayers to adopt an accounting period that conforms to the period used by the
principal member.
C Adjustments For Intra-Group Transactions
The general rule in combined reporting is that transactions between members of
a combined group, to the extent these transactions are part of the unitary business, are
either totally ignored or deferred. Generally, the transactions are treated as a wash.
This section addresses some refinements that a state should make in the wash rule to
avoid duplicative taxation and to prevent tax avoidance.
Section IV.C. 1. provides a general description of the operation of the wash rule.
Section IV.C.2. describes the interaction of the wash rule with the rules for
determining basis and discusses the adjustments that are needed in the basis rules to
avoid both the undertaxation and the overtaxation of income. Section IV.C.3.
addresses transitional problems.
1. Description of the Wash Rule
In general, the wash rule applies to transactions between members of the
combined group that occur as part of the unitary business. For example, if PCo and
its subsidiary, SCo, are members of a combined group, the proceeds and income from
a sale by PCo to SCo of inventory property used in the unitary business would not be
included in the combined report. A subsequent sale by SCo of the inventory property
to retail customers, however, would be recognized. The gain would be computed by
giving SCo a basis in the inventory property equal to PCo's basis. The proceeds of
the sale would be included in the receipts (sales) factor of the apportionment formula.
The wash sale rule does not apply to transactions between members of the
combined report that occur outside of the unitary business. For example, if PCo in
the example above sells an investment asset to SCo that is not related to their unitary
business, the gain or loss on the sale would be recognized currently but would not be
included in the combined report. It would be included in PCo's separate income and
would be taxable in accordance with the rules applicable to that type of income.'
In some circumstances, the wash rule helps the taxpayer. For example,
eliminating intra-group dividends paid out of income derived from a unitary business
prevents the group from being taxed once when the income is earned and again when
the income is distributed as a dividend from one member of the unitary group to
another. As illustrated in the example above, the wash rule also can prevent
premature realization of income when inventory property has been sold to one
member of the unitary group but still remains within the same unitary business.n2
In other circumstances, the wash rule protects the government from taxpayer
abuses. For example, it prevents taxpayers from recognizing losses on the intra-
181. The tax authorities should have the discretion to adjust the terms of a transaction between
members of a combined group to reflect income properly if the wash rule is not applicable to that
transaction.
182. See Cal. FTB Pub. 1061, supra note 154, at 6.
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group sale of assets that continue to be used in the unitary business. Also, in some
circumstances, the wash rule ensures that transactions between members of the
combined report do not impact the apportionment of income of the unitary
business through inappropriate changes in the property or sales factor. s3
For example, if PCo and SCo constitute a unitary business, PCo's sale of an
asset used in the unitary business to SCo not only will have no effect on the
recognition of income or loss but also will have no effect on the original cost of
the asset. The sale will have no effect on the property factor in Louisiana, which
is the taxpayer's original cost in the asset minus the reserve." 4 If the sales
proceeds otherwise would have been included in the sales factor,", the wash rule
prevents the proceeds from affecting the sales factor. Without the wash rule one
mem 6 er of the combined group might sell an asset to another at a loss in order
to realize the loss and to produce a more advantageous sales factor in the
apportionment formula."'
The wash rule also prevents inappropriate changes in the tax attributes
associated with the intra-group sale of unitary assets. For example, under the
wash rule, a unitary group would not recognize gain on the sale of depreciable
property from one member of a unitary group to another, and the purchaser
would not acquire a stepped-up basis in the asset for purposes of depreciation
deductions. Gain or loss would be recognized when the buyer or seller ceases to
be a member of the unitary group or when the asset is no longer used within the
unitary business."'
Under recently adopted regulations, California does not employ the wash
rule to intra-group sales of depreciable property. Consistent with the wash rule,
it does exclude the proceeds from the sale of depreciable property from the
income of the combined group. Contrary to the wash rule, however, it allows the
buyer to take a stepped-up basis in the depreciable property. To prevent a
double benefit, the seller is required to recognize income each year for the
incremental increase in the allowable depreciation deduction that the buyer
claims on account of the increase in its depreciable basis. s ' This same approach
is used by taxpayers filing a Federal consolidated return. "9 California's apparent
purpose in departing from the wash rule is to allow a unitary group to conform
183. For a more complete description of the types of transactionsthat are treated as a wash, see
Cal. FTP Pub. 1061, supra note 154, at 5-6; 18 Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5-1.
184. La. R.S.47:287.95(G)(2001).
185. Under some circumstances, sales of capital assets are not reflected in the sales factor. See
MTC, supra note 86, Reg. IV.18.(c).(1).
186. In the absence of a vigilant tax department, a combined reporting regime that permits a
water's edge election may encourage some taxpayers to try to secure advantages in the apportionment
formula through transactions with an affiliated company that is excluded from the combined group
because of the water's edge election. This possibility is one of the unfortunate costs of permitting a
water's edge election. As noted in supra Part III.E., we recommend the water's edge election foi
practical and political reasons, not for tax policy reasons.
187. Cal. FTB Pub. 1061, supra note 154, at 5-6.
188. See 18 Cal. Code Reg. § 25106.5-1 (2001).
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(cX7)(iiXEx. 4) (as amended in 2000).
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its accounts kept for California purposes with the accounts it keeps for purposes
of its Federal consolidated return.
For its general rule, we recommend that Louisiana adopt the less complex
wash rule described above rather than the California rule. We do appreciate the
benefit, however, of coordination with the Federal consolidated return regulations.
To achieve that goal, we recommend that a unitary group filing a Federal
consolidated return be permitted to elect, with the permission of the tax department,
to use the California rule. The tax department should be authorized to impose
conditions on the election that it believes are necessary to reflect income clearly or
to prevent abuse.
2. Adjustments to the Basis of Affiliate Stock
One policy goal of tax basis rules in an income tax is to prevent taxpayers from
being subject to duplicative taxation on the disposition of assets acquired with
money or other property that had previously been subject to the income tax.
Another important policy goal is to limit allowable losses on the disposition of an
asset to the amount paid for that asset out of previously taxed income. As
explained below, it is sometimes necessary to make certain basis adjustments for
intra-group transactions to achieve these goals for members of a unitary group
filing a combined report. The Federal government in its consolidated return rules
requires adjustments similar to the ones we recommend for Louisiana.'90
In furtherance of the general policies set forth above, it is sometimes
appropriate in a combined reporting system to allow a parent corporation to
increase its basis in the stock of its subsidiary when the income of that subsidiary
has been included in the pre-apportionment income of the unitary group. Similarly,
it is sometimes necessary to require a parent corporation to reduce its basis in the
stock of its subsidiary when a loss incurred by that subsidiary has been deducted
from the pre-apportionment income of the unitary group.'"'
To illustrate the duplicated gain issue, consider PCo, a parent corporation that
forms SCo, a subsidiary, with a contribution to capital of $100. Accordingly,
PCo's basis in the SCo stock is $100. PCo and SCo are engaged in a unitary
business in State L and other states and file a combined report in State L. SCo
earns $500 ofpre-apportionment unitary business income, and the value of its stock
thereby increases by $500, from $100 to $600. The $500 of unitary business
income earned by SCo is added to the unitary group's pre-apportionment taxable
income. The group apportions this amount to State L and other states under the
applicable apportionment formula.
Assume that PCo sells its SCo stock to an unrelated buyer for $600. In the
absence of a basis adjustment, PCo would recognize gain on the sale of $500 ($600
- $ 100), which would be included in the pre-apportionment income of the unitary
190. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b) (as amended in 1999).
191. The basis adjustment rules for earnings and distributions are strongly analogous to the rules
developed by the Federal government for preventing duplicative taxation of gain derived from the sale
ofa CFC. I.R.C. § 961(a) (2001). See McIntyre, Int'l Treatise, supra note 25, at § 7/B.4.2.
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business. The result would be duplicative taxation of the profits of $500 earned by
SCo. To prevent that result, PCo should be allowed to increase its basis in its SCo
stock by $500 (the amount of SCo profits included in the pre-apportionment
income of the unitary group). If the SCo stock sold for $700, however, PCo would
recognize a gain of $100 - an appropriate result because that additional $100 in
gain was due to a previously untaxed appreciation in the value of SCo's assets.
Rather than duplicative gain, duplicative loss can also occur without proper
basis adjustments. To illustrate, assume that PCo in the example above owns all
of the stock of TCo. It formed TCo by contributing $100 in exchange for the TCo
stock. As a result, its basis in the TCo stock is $100. TCo suffers a pre-
apportionment unitary business loss of $50 on the PCo and TCo unitary business.
That loss reduces the pre-apportionment business income of the unitary group by
$50. It is also likely to reduce the value of the TCo stock from $100 to $50.
Assume that PCo sells the TCo stock for $50. Unless PCo's basis in the stock is
reduced by $50, PCo will realize a $50 loss on the sale of the stock, thereby
reducing the pre-apportionment income of the unitary group a second time by $50.
California, the leading state practitioner of combined reporting, apparently
does not make the adjustments to basis that we recommend for Louisiana. The
California statute does not specifically provide for these basis adjustment, due, we
assume, to legislative indifference. The California tax authorities attempted to
prevent the double use of a loss, as described above, by invoking their general
interpretive powers. California's attempt failed.'92 The California experience
suggests that a state that is adopting a combined reporting rule should include a
basis adjustment rule in the enabling legislation. The details of the rule, however,
should be worked out in department regulations.'93
If a combined reporting state provides for an upward adjustment in a parent
company's basis in the stock of its subsidiary to reflect the unitary income earned
by that subsidiary, it should make a corresponding reduction in that basis when the
income is distributed to the parent. For example, assume that SCo in the example
above earns $500 of unitary taxable income and PCo increases its basis in the SCo
stock by that amount. If SCo distributes the $500 of income to PCo, then PCo
should be required to reduce its tax basis in its SCo stock by $500 to reflect the
reduction in SCo's assets. Without that reduction in basis, PCo would have a loss
of $500 if it sold the SCo stock for its presumed fair market value of $100. A
reduction in the basis of the SCo stock from $600 to $100 would properly reflect
PCo's remaining investment in SCo after the distribution and would eliminate an
improper loss on the sale of the SCo stock.'"
192. Appeal of Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 62-SBE 014 (Cal. State Bd. of Eq. Mar. 2, 1962). In
Safeway Stores, the second loss (on the stock) occurred as a part of a liquidation of the subsidiary.
Under California law, the loss may possibly have been a nonbusiness loss. Ifso, Safeway Stores may
not prevent the California tax authorities from requiring a basis adjustment when both of the losses
clearly constitute business losses includible in a combined report.
193. A state may prefer to deal with the duplicative gain and loss issue entirely by regulation. In
that case, the statute's delegation of regulatory authority to the tax department should be unambiguous
so that the resulting regulations would be given the force of law by the courts.
194. The adjustment to basis should be made whether the distribution is made by payment of a
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3. Transition Issues
When a state adopts combined reporting, it must decide what adjustment
should be made for intra-group transactions that were initiated at least in part under
the old regime. In our view, transition relief is appropriate to avoid duplicative
taxation under the old and the new regime. It is inappropriate, however, when its
effect is to extend a benefit obtainable under the new regime to transactions
consummated under the old regime. In the grey areas between these extremes, we
recommend flexibility and pragmatism.
Section IV.C.3.a. addresses transition issues arising from the general wash rule
discussed in Section IV.C. 1., above. Ordering rules used to determine whether a
dividend has been paid out of profits accumulated before or after the adoption of
combined reporting are addressed in Section IV.C.3.b. Transition issues relating
to basis adjustments are addressed in Section IV.C.3.c.
a. Transition Issues Under the Wash Rule
In general, transition rules are not necessary or desirable to modify the tax
consequences under the wash rule of an intra-group transaction that was concluded
prior to the adoption of a Combined reporting regime. A separate reporting system
typically contains its own rules to prevent duplicative taxation. The shift to a
combined reporting regime should not be the occasion for redesigning those rules.
The wash rule should not be applied retroactively to transactions that occurred
under the separate filing regime absent a showing that the latter rules would be
ineffective in blocking duplicative taxation due to the adoption of combined
reporting.
Consider, for example, the wash rule that eliminates a sale of inventory
property between members of a combined group. Assume that PCo sells inventory
property to SCo, its subsidiary in year one, and SCo sells that property to unrelated
persons in year two. Year one is a separate reporting year and year two is a
combined reporting year. PCo and SCo constitute a unitary group, so the sale from
PCo to SCo would have been ignored if the wash rule had applied to year one.
Taking the sale into account in year one, however, was a perfectly acceptable result
under a separate accounting regime. Protection against duplicative taxation is
provided, moreover, by allowing SCo to take a tax basis in the inventory property
equal to the price paid to PCo. Under these conditions, it would be cumbersome
and unnecessary to retroactively apply the wash rule to the sale between PCo and
SCo and to undo the basis adjustment made under the prior regime.
Transition relief is appropriate, however, when the application ofthe combined
reporting regime to transactions having some link to the prior separate reporting
regime present a special risk of duplicative taxation. We believe that such a risk
may arise when a dividend is paid after the adoption of combined reporting out of
dividend or through some alternative mechanism.
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profits that were earned under the prior separate reporting regime. If those
dividends would have been exempt from tax under the prior separate reporting
regime, they also should be exempt under the combined reporting regime.
Under current Louisiana law, a corporation may exclude a dividend from its
income to the extent that the dividend was paid out of income previously taxed by
Louisiana.95 If Louisiana adopts combined reporting, it will need a transition rule
to preserve that policy with respect to dividends received under the combined
reporting regime and paid out of income earned under the separate reporting
regime.'"
The proposed transition rule would apply to exclude that part of any dividend
that is paid out of profits that were taxed by Louisiana because of the operation of
its apportionment formula under the separate reporting regime. The proposed
transition rule should not apply to a dividend that was paid out of profits
accumulated prior to the adoption of the combined reporting regime that were
never taxed by the State.
Consider, for example, PCo and its subsidiary, SCo, members of a unitary
group. In year one, a separate reporting year, SCo earned profits of $400.
Louisiana taxed SCo on $100-its apportioned share of those profits under the
separate reporting regime then in place. In year two, Louisiana adopted combined
reporting. In that year, SCo distributed a dividend of $400 to PCo. Under these
facts, we believe that $300 of the dividend should be included in the combined
report and $100 should be excluded in order for the treatment of dividends to be
consistent with the dividend policy of current Louisiana law.
b. Ordering Rules
In some cases, a member of a unitary group making a distribution to its parent
corporation may have untaxed profits accumulated under a separate reporting
regime and also taxed profits accumulated under the combined reporting regime.
To deal with such a situation, a state needs to employ an accounting convention
that determines the category of accumulated profits out of which a particular
distribution is deemed to be made. The rules specifying that convention are
typically referred to as ordering rules. We propose the following ordering rules: 97
(1) Dividends are treated as paid out of current earnings and profits
to the extent thereof.
(2) If the dividends paid exceed current earnings and profits, then the
dividends are treated as paid out of earnings and profits accumulated in
195. La. R.S. 47:287.73(CXI )(2001)and L.A.C. 61:1115. This method ofeliminatingduplicative
taxation is being litigated in California inFarmer Brothers Co. v. FMB, Los Angeles Superior Court
Case No. BC237663, as violating the Commerce Clause because relief is extended only to dividends
paid from in-state sources.
196. We are not necessarily endorsing the practice of Louisiana and many other states of
exempting only that portion of a dividend that is paid out of income previously taxed by the state. The
proper treatment of such dividends is a matter beyond the scope of this Article.
197. Cf Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25106 (West Supp. 2001).
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preceding years, beginning with the year closest (i.e., reverse
chronological order) to the current year.
To illustrate the operation of the above ordering rules, assume that SCo began
operations in year one and the current year is year five. SCo has earnings and
profits for each of those years of $1,000. In year five, SCo paid a dividend of
$2,500 to PCo, its parent corporation and a member of its unitary group. Under the
ordering rules, $1,000 of the dividend will be treated as paid out of the earnings
and profits arising in year five, $1,000 out of the earnings and profits arising in
year four, and $500 out of the earnings and profits arising in year three.
As with most accounting conventions, there is some element of arbitrariness
to the above rules. We favor the first ordering rule because it allows a unitary
group to be taxed on dividends under the combined reporting regime as long as the
dividends paid by a member of the unitary group do not exceed its current earnings
and profits. We believe the results achieved under combined reporting are
desirable and the sooner they apply to corporations the better. The rule is also
relatively simply to administer and conforms to the Federal ordering rule for
dividends.' We favor the second rule because it corresponds to the dividend
ordering rules of the Internal Revenue Code'"and taxpayers are presumably well
versed in its application.
c. Transition Issues under the Basis-Adjustment Rules
In general, the basis rules described in Section IV.C.2. should not be applied
retroactively to give a member of a unitary group an addition to, or subtraction
from, its basis in the stock of another member of the unitary group to take into
account events occurring before the adoption of combined reporting. The purpose
of the basis rules is to prevent duplicative taxation of combined profits or
duplicative use of combined losses. These rules, by their own terms, do not apply
to companies that are not part of the unitary combined group. It would be
anomalous to provide these rules to transactions that occurred when those members
were not being taxed as members of that group.
Assume, for example, that PCo owns all of the stock of SCo and that the two
companies are engaged in a unitary business. In year one, a separate reporting
year, SCo earns income of $600. In year two, a combined reporting year, PCo sells
its stock in SCo to unrelated persons. PCo would not be entitled to an increase of
$600 in its basis in the stock of SCo because the $600 of profits were not included
in the combined report. There is no strong reason for fashioning a special
transition rule to deal with this case because the potential for duplicative taxation
was part of the tax regime in place when the income of $600 was earned. In these
circumstances, PCo should not receive a basis adjustment.
. Similarly, we would not require a member of a unitary group to reduce its
basis in the stock of a subsidiary because the subsidiary suffered a loss under the
198. I.R.C. § 316(a) (2001) (flush language).
199. Id.
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prior separate reporting regime. Assume, for example, that PCo and its two
subsidiaries, SCo and TCo, form a unitary group. PCo acquired the SCo stock in
a taxable transaction for $1,500. In year one, a separate reporting year, SCo
suffered a loss of $500. That loss had the effect of reducing the value of SCo stock
from $1,500 to $1,000. In year two, a combined reporting year, PCo sold the SCo
stock for $1,000. The sale produces a loss of $500 unless PCo is required to adjust
its basis downward by $500 for the loss incurred in year one. We recommend that
no basis adjustment be made. The potential for a duplicative loss was part of the
tax regime in place when the loss of $500 occurred. Assuming the sale was made
as part of the unitary business, the loss of $500 should be includible in the
combined report.
V. CONCLUSION
Saving nickels, saving dimes
Workin ' till the sun don't shine
Lookin 'forward to happier times
On Blue Bayou.2"
The Louisiana corporate income tax will not be a stable source of revenue for
government spending programs unless Louisiana protects it from the
encroachments of the corporate tax planners. Over the past decade, multistate tax
planning has become increasingly concentrated in the large, multinational
accounting firms and a small number of specialized law firms. Those accounting
firms no longer make their large profits from compliance work-the traditional
function of accountants. They now have dynamic and growing state practices
geared to minimizing state corporate taxes for their multi-state and multinational
clients.20 ' A state that does not respond to the emerging reality of scorched-earth
tax avoidance is almost certain to lose the ability to raise more than "nickels and
dimes" from its corporate income tax.
Happier times are ahead, however, if Louisiana adopts a combined reporting
regime. Combined reporting offers a formidable defense against many of the most
pernicious forms of tax avoidance. In this Article, we have presented a detailed
proposal for implementing a combined reporting regime in Louisiana. Whenever
possible, we have borrowed design features that have been used successfully by
California and the other combined-reporting states. Our proposal, however, has
some distinctive design features of its own. We are confident that this spicy
concoction will not suit the taste of the out-of-state tax evaders.
No one should expect that multinational and multi-state firms will embrace a
proposal to enact a combined reporting rule. Many of them will oppose it for the
same reason we support it-because it will increase the tax liability of multi-state
200. Roy Orbison, "Blue Bayou" (1963).
201. One recent study indicates that $1 of investment in tax planning typically results in a cut in
state taxes of $100. See Sanjay Gupta & Lillian F. Mills, Multistate Tax Planning: Benefits of Multiple
Jurisdictions and Tax Planning Assistance (unpublished study, June, 2000).
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businesses engaging in tax-avoidance schemes. Opponents of corporate tax reform
in the business community usually assert that adoption of reforms they oppose will
be bad for a state's "business climate." The Louisiana Legislature should expect
that this loose charge will be made if it moves to adopt combined reporting. At
best, the charge is unproven.2 2 At worst, it suggests that the only corporate tax that
is compatible with a good business climate is a tax that corporations are able to
avoid.
202. In his Senate confirmation hearings, Treasury Secretary-designate Paul O'Neill stated: "As
a businessman I never made an investment decision based on the tax code... If you give money away
I will take it, but good business people don't do things because of inducements." Joseph Kahn,
Treasury Choice Variesfrom Bush on Tax Outlook, NY. Times, Jan. 18, 2001, at A-I, A-16. Roger
Smith, former Chairman of General Motors, whose Saturn plant was sought after by nearly every
governor, stressed that "tax breaks can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Detroit Free Press, Mar.
18, 1985, at IA. According to Smith, "we're going to be in business for the long term... you've got
to look at more than just what the great big cookie is that's coming in on the plate." Id. Consistent with
this philosophy, the first state GM eliminated as a site for the Saturn plant was Floridaa state that is
perceived as having an extremely favorable tax climate (e.g., nopersonal income tax, no estate tax, a
double-weighted receipts factor, and no worldwide combined reporting). For an overview of the
business climate literature, see Enrich, Saving the States, supra note 163, at 392-97; Pomp, supra note
I11, at 393.

